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Abstract
This paper is concerned with learning decision makers’ (DMs) preferences using data
on observed choices from a finite set of risky alternatives with monetary outcomes. We
propose a discrete choice model with unobserved heterogeneity in consideration sets
(the collection of alternatives considered by DMs) and unobserved heterogeneity in
standard risk aversion. In this framework, stochastic choice is driven both by different
rankings of alternatives induced by unobserved heterogeneity in risk preferences and
by different sets of alternatives considered. We obtain sufficient conditions for semi-
nonparametric point identification of both the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity
in preferences and the distribution of consideration sets. Our method yields an esti-
mator that is easy to compute and that can be used in markets with a large number of
alternatives. We apply our method to a dataset on property insurance purchases. We
find that although households are on average strongly risk averse, they consider lower
coverages more frequently than higher coverages. Finally, we estimate the monetary
losses associated with limited consideration in our application.
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1 Introduction
This paper is concerned with learning decision makers’ (DMs) preferences using data on
observed choices from a finite set of risky alternatives with monetary outcomes. The prevail-
ing empirical approach to study this problem merges expected utility theory (EUT) models
with econometric methods for discrete choice analysis.1 Standard EUT assumes that the
DM assesses a risky alternative by computing its expected utility; evaluates all available
alternatives; and chooses the alternative yielding highest expected utility. The DM’s risk
aversion is determined by the concavity of her underlying Bernoulli utility function. The set
of all alternatives – the choice set – is assumed to be observable by the researcher.
We depart from this standard approach by proposing a discrete choice model with unob-
served heterogeneity in risk aversion and unobserved heterogeneity in consideration sets.
Each DM evaluates only the alternatives in her consideration set, which is a subset of the
choice set. Hence, stochastic choice is driven both by different rankings of alternatives in-
duced by unobserved heterogeneity in risk preferences and by different sets of alternatives
considered. Our first contribution is to establish that the requirements of standard economic
theory, coupled with a slight strengthening of the classic conditions for semi-nonparametric
identification of discrete choice models with full consideration and identical choice sets (see,
e.g., Matzkin, 2007),2 yield semi-nonparametric identification of both the distribution of
unobserved heterogeneity in risk aversion and the distribution of consideration sets.3
Our second contribution is to provide a simple method to compute our likelihood-based
estimator, whose computational complexity grows polynomially in the number of alternatives
in the choice set.4 In particular, our method does not require enumerating all possible subsets
of the choice set. If it did, the computational complexity would grow exponentially with the
size of the choice set.
Our third contribution is to elucidate the applicability and the advantages of our framework
over the standard application of random utility models (RUMs) with additively separable
1For a non-exhaustive list of papers in this literature see Starmer (2000) and Barseghyan, Molinari,
O’Donoghue, & Teitelbaum (2018). We discuss an important class of non-expected utility theory models
and how our analysis applies to these models later in the paper.
2In fact, with a binary consideration set, the former and the latter coincide.
3The identification results are semi-nonparametric because we specify the utility function up to a DM-
specific preference parameter. We establish nonparametric identification of the distribution of the latter.
4The function evaluation time of the log-likelihood objective function grows linearly with the number
of alternatives. Provided that the objective function is locally concave, the local rate of convergence of the
standard SQP program is quadratic. See, for example, Boggs & Tolle (1995).
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unobserved heterogeneity (e.g., Mixed Logit models) and full consideration. First, our model
can generate zero shares for non-dominated alternatives. Second, the model has no difficulty
explaining relatively large shares of dominated alternatives. Third, in markets with many
insurance domains, our model can match not only the marginal but also the joint distribu-
tion of choices across domains. Forth, our framework is immune to an important criticism
recently raised by Apesteguia & Ballester (2018) against using standard RUMs to study
decision making under risk. As these authors note, combining standard EUT with additive
noise results in non-monotonicity of choice probabilities in the risk preferences, a clearly
undesirable feature.
In general, distinguishing heterogeneous preferences from heterogeneous consideration us-
ing discrete choice data is a formidable task. When a DM chooses an alternative, this can
be either because that alternative yields the highest expected utility among those in her
entire choice set or because the DM does not consider some better available alternatives
and the chosen one is the best in her consideration set, implying different distributions of
preferences. We show that this seemingly inescapable identification problem can be resolved
under certain conditions by leveraging standard requirements of economic theory. Specifi-
cally, our random preference models satisfy the classic Single Crossing Property (SCP) of
Mirrlees (1971); Spence (1974): the preference order of any two alternatives switches only
once on the support of the preference coefficient.5 The SCP is central to important stud-
ies of decision making under risk, as well as those in other fields of Economics.6 More so,
as we make clear, the SCP is necessary for nonparametric identification of the preference
parameter distribution in the standard model with full consideration and homogeneous ob-
served choice sets. Coupled with three additional requirements (imposed in the literature
on point identification of limited consideration models), we show that the SCP delivers non-
parametric identification of the preference-parameter distribution even in the presence of
unobserved heterogeneity in consideration sets. The first two requirements are: (1) speci-
fication of a consideration set formation model and (2) independence between unobserved
heterogeneity in consideration and in risk preferences, conditional on observable character-
istics. The second requirement is part of the standard framework: when all DMs consider
the entire (non-stochastic) choice set, consideration is independent of underlying preferences
5The EUT framework with concave Bernoulli utility satisfies the SCP. The SCP requires that if a DM
with a certain degree of risk aversion prefers a safer lottery to a riskier one, then all DMs with higher risk
aversion also prefer the safer lottery. As we discuss in Section 8, many non-EU models, when they feature
unidimensional preference heterogeneity, also satisfy SCP.
6E.g., Athey (2001); Apesteguia, Ballester, & Lu (2017); Chiappori, Salanie´, Salanie´, & Gandhi (2018).
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by definition. Requirements (1) and (2) are motivated by Barseghyan, Coughlin, Molinari,
& Teitelbaum (2019), who establish that in the absence of restrictions on the consideration
set formation and its relation with risk preferences, one can partially but not point iden-
tify the distribution of risk preferences (even parametrically). The final requirement is that
there exists a DM-characteristic with large support that shifts preferences over alternatives,
but does not affect consideration. In RUMs, requiring existence of a regressor with large
support (or an equivalent assumption) is necessary for nonparametric identification even
without probabilistic consideration (e.g., Matzkin, 2007). The additional restriction in our
framework, implicit in the full-consideration literature, is that the large-support regressor
does not affect the probability of considering any of the alternatives in the choice set. We
do, however, allow for the case that the large support regressor is not alternative specific,
that is, it may only vary across DMs. Moreover, the consideration distribution may depend
on the other characteristics of the DMs and of all alternatives.
With this structure in place, our identification result leverages a simple intuition: as the
large-support regressor takes values sufficiently large or small, the alternatives in the choice
set are unambiguously ranked for all possible realizations of the unobserved risk-preference
coefficient. Hence, the choice frequency observed in the data is a function of only the con-
sideration probabilities and, under weak restrictions, this function admits a unique solution
for the consideration probabilities. The SCP then allows us to trace out the distribution of
preferences given variation in the large-support regressor.
We describe our identification approach in detail for two probabilistic consideration models,
each having up to as many parameters as the size of the choice set. These two models are
different in nature and can be used as a blueprint to study the empirical content of many
others, as we explain in the paper. The first model, termed the Alternative Specific Random
Consideration (ARC) model, is inspired by Manski (1977) and Manzini & Mariotti (2014). In
this model, alternative j appears in the DM’s consideration set with an alternative-specific
probability ϕj and each alternative enters the consideration set independent of all other
alternatives. The second model, termed the Random Consideration Level (RCL) model,
posits that the DM first draws the size of her consideration set, l (her consideration level,
possibly determined by her cognitive ability), and then randomly picks l alternatives to
consider, with each alternative having the same probability of being picked.
Of course, random preference models like the ones we consider are random utility models as
originally envisioned by McFadden (1974) (for a textbook treatment see Manski, 2007). We
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show that our random preference models with probabilistic consideration can be written as
RUMs with unobserved heterogeneity in risk aversion and with an additive error that has
a discrete distribution with support {−∞, 0}. It is then natural to draw parallels with the
mixed (random coefficient) logit model (e.g., McFadden & Train, 2000). In our setting, the
Mixed Logit model boils down to assuming that, given the DM’s risk aversion, her evaluation
of an alternative equals its expected utility summed with an unobserved heterogeneity term
capturing the DM’s idiosyncratic taste for unobserved characteristics of that alternative.
However, in some markets it is hard to envision such characteristics: For example, many
insurance contracts are identical in all aspects except for the coverage level and price.7 In
other contexts, unobservable characteristics may affect choice mostly via consideration – as
we model – rather than via “additive noise”.8
As in the Mixed Logit model, our models assume independence of the additive error with the
observable payoff-relevant characteristics and the unobservable heterogeneity in preferences.
However, in the ARC model, the additive error is independent across alternatives but is not
identically distributed; in the RCL model, the additive error is identically distributed but
is not independent across alternatives; and in the Mixed Logit, the additive error is i.i.d.
across alternatives. These differences generate contrasting implications in several respects.
First, the RCL model and the Mixed Logit model generally imply that each alternative
has a positive probability of being chosen, while the ARC model can generate zero shares
by setting the consideration probability of a given alternative to zero. Second, the RCL
model and the Mixed Logit model satisfy a Generalized Dominance Property that we derive:
if for any degree of risk aversion alternative j is dominated by either alternative k or m,
then the probability of choosing j must be no larger than the probability of choosing k or
m. The ARC model does not abide Generalized Dominance. Third, in the ARC and the
RCL models, choice probabilities depend on the ordinal expected utility rankings of the
alternatives, while, in the Mixed Logit, choice probabilities depend on the cardinal expected
utility rankings. As we explain in Section 5, this difference implies that choice probabilities
are monotone in risk preferences in our models, while in the Mixed Logit model they are
not (Apesteguia & Ballester, 2018). Armed with the identification results obtained for the
ARC and RCL models, we show in Section 6 that our approach easily extends to the case
where consideration sets form based on liquidity constraints or behavioral phenomena such
as extremeness aversion.
7E.g., employer provided health insurance, auto, or home insurance offered by a single company.
8E.g., a DM may only consider those supplemental prescription drug plans that cover specific medications.
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Our empirical application is a study of households’ deductible choices across three lines of
insurance coverage: auto collision, auto comprehensive, and home (all perils). The aim of our
exercise is to estimate the underlying distribution of risk preferences and the consideration
parameters; to assess the resulting fit of the models; and to evaluate the monetary cost of
limited consideration. We find that the ARC model does a remarkable job at matching the
distribution of observed choices, and because of its aforementioned properties, outperforms
both the RCL model and the EUT model with additive extreme value type I (Gumbel)
error. Under the ARC model, we find that although households are on average strongly risk
averse, they consider lower coverages more often than higher coverages. Finally, the average
monetary losses resulting from limited consideration are $49.
2 Related Literature
The literature concerned with the formulation, identification, and estimation of discrete
choice models with limited consideration is vast. However, to our knowledge, there is no
previous work applying such models to the study of decision making under risk, except for
the contemporaneous work of Barseghyan et al. (2019). They study models of decision mak-
ing under risk, where unobserved heterogeneity in preferences as well as in choice and/or
consideration sets is allowed for. They additionally allow for arbitrary dependence between
consideration sets and preferences, and impose no restrictions on the consideration set for-
mation process. They show that such unrestricted forms of heterogeneity yield, in general,
partial but not point identification of the model, even when a parametric distribution for
preference heterogeneity is specified. They obtain bounds on the distribution of consideration
sets’ size, but no other features of the distribution of consideration sets can be learned.
In this paper we take a conceptually different approach. As in the entire related litera-
ture on point identification of limited consideration models, we maintain independence of
consideration sets and preferences and we focus on specific consideration sets’ formation
processes. The latter are grounded in a sizable literature spanning experimental economics,
microeconomics, behavioral economics, psychology, and marketing which aims to formalize
the cognitive process underlying the formation of consideration sets.9
9See, e.g., Simon (1959); Tversky (1972); Howard (1977); Manski (1977); Treisman & Gelade (1980);
Hauser & Wernerfelt (1990); Shocker, Ben-Akiva, Boccara, & Nedungadi (1991); Roberts & Lattin (1991);
Ben-Akiva & Boccara (1995); Eliaz & Spiegler (2011); Masatlioglu, Nakajima, & Ozbay (2012); Manzini &
Mariotti (2014); Caplin, Dean, & Leahy (2018). Even when DMs pay full attention, they may face unobserved
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For the remainder of this section, we discuss the literature on identification of limited consid-
eration models that are closely related to the ARC and RCL models. To identify parametric
models of demand, previous contributions in this area have typically relied on auxiliary data
revealing the consideration set composition (e.g., Draganska & Klapper, 2011; Conlon &
Mortimer, 2013; Honka & Chintagunta, 2017), or on the existence of regressor(s) that im-
pact utility but not consideration (or vice versa) (e.g., Goeree, 2008; Gaynor et al., 2016;
Heiss, McFadden, Winter, Wuppermann, & Zhou, 2016; Hortasu, Madanizadeh, & Puller,
2017).10 In contrast, we establish semi-nonparametric identification of the distributions of
unobserved heterogeneity in preferences and in consideration sets through a combination of
the SCP with an exclusion restriction and a large support assumption.
A recent related literature, closest to our own work, studies various departures from the
tight parametric structure of the earlier analysis of limited consideration models. Dard-
anoni, Manzini, Mariotti, & Tyson (2017) consider a stochastic choice model with homoge-
neous preferences and heterogeneous cognitive types.11 The cognitive types are implemented
through the RCL model and a variant of the ARC model. In the RCL model, the cognitive
type is the number of alternatives the DM is able to consider. In the ARC model, the type
is the probability with which the DM considers an alternative (which is assumed constant
across alternatives). The authors show how one can learn the moments of the distribution
of types from a single cross section of aggregate choice shares. A key assumption for identi-
fication is that there exists a default alternative and the researcher observes the frequency
with which the default alternative is chosen. In our paper, we do not require that the default
option is observed and we are flexible on its existence.
Cattaneo, Ma, Masatlioglu, & Suleymanov (2017) propose a general random attention model
where the probability of drawing a consideration set decreases as the choice set enlarges.
Their model, however, does not allow for unobserved heterogeneity in preferences, and yields
partial identification results while requiring rich observable variation in the choice set.
Abaluck & Adams (2018) study identification of an additive error random utility model with
consideration formation similar to that in our ARC model, a variant of the RCL model (also
constraints on what alternatives they can choose (e.g., Gaynor, Propper, & Seiler, 2016).
10Crawford, Grithz, & Iariax (2017) estimate a Fixed-Effect Logit type model that (1) utilizes observed
purchase decisions (in a panel or a group-homogeneous cross-section) to construct “sufficient sets” of alter-
natives that lie within DMs’ feasible sets; (2) given the “sufficient sets”, uses classic techniques on estimating
logit models on subsets of feasible sets.
11Heterogeneous tastes are also explored. To obtain identification, however, one of two strong assumptions
are imposed. Either the taste distribution is known or preferences are linear in observable alternative
characteristics and there is an additive error term with extreme value type 1 distribution.
6
considered in Ho, Hogan, & Scott Morton, 2017; Hortasu et al., 2017; Heiss et al., 2016),
and a mix of the two. Abaluck & Adams (2018) method and ours are distinct and comple-
mentary. They require a default option, and the existence of a regressor (e.g., price) that is
alternative specific and enters the indirect utility function linearly (or additively separably
with shape restrictions). The price of each alternative is required to have large support, to
exhibit cross-alternative variation (i.e., independent variation for each alternative), and to be
excluded from the consideration probability of all other alternatives. When modeling choice
under risk, concave utility yields that price enters neither linearly nor additively separably.
More importantly, our work aims at providing a method to learn DMs’ risk preferences and
consideration probabilities from their choices of insurance products. Many important recent
empirical contributions in this area use data from a single company – either a firm selling
insurance or a firm offering health insurance to its employees.12 In their data, observable
characteristics with large support are typically DM specific and not alternative specific, so
that the Abaluck & Adams (2018) method does not apply.13 In contrast, our framework
does not require a default option and we only assume that the large support regressor is
independent of consideration set formation. This regressor may or may not be alternative
specific.
3 Models
3.1 Decision Making under Risk in a Market Setting: An Example
To set the stage we consider the following insurance market. There is an underlying risk
of a loss with probability equal to µ that varies across DMs. A finite number of insurance
alternatives are available against this loss. Each alternative is a pair (dj, pj), j ∈ {1, .., D}.
The first element is a deductible, which is the DM’s out of pocket expense in case a loss
occurs. Deductibles are decreasing with index j. All deductibles are less than the lowest
realization of the loss. The second element is a price, which also varies across DMs. For each
DM there is a baseline price p¯ that determines prices for all alternatives faced by the DM
according to a multiplication rule, pj = gj · p¯ + δ, where δ is a small positive amount and
12See, e.g.,Cohen & Einav (2007); Einav, Finkelstein, Pascu, & Cullen (2012); Barseghyan, Molinari,
O’Donoghue, & Teitelbaum (2013); Handel (2013); Bhargava, Loewenstein, & Sydnor (2017).
13For example, in the context of health insurance there is a fixed price for each insurance plan offered to
all employees and there is large variation in risk across employees.
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gj increases with j: lower deductibles provide more coverage, and hence cost more. Both gj
and δ are invariant across DMs. The lotteries that the DM faces can be written as follows:
Lj(x) ≡ (−pj, 1− µ;−pj − dj, µ) ,
where x ≡ (p¯, µ). DMs are expected utility maximizers. Given initial wealth w, the expected
utility of deductible lottery Lj(x) is given by
EU(Lj(x)) = (1− µ)u (w − pj) + µu (w − pj − dj) ,
where u(·) is a Bernoulli utility function defined over final wealth states. We assume that
u(·) belongs to a certain family of utility functions that are fully characterized by a single
coefficient ν (e.g. CARA, CRRA or NTD).14 This coefficient of risk aversion is randomly
distributed across DMs and has bounded support.
The relationship between risk aversion, underlying prices, and loss probabilities is standard.
At sufficiently high p¯ or low µ, less coverage is always preferred to more coverage: L1  L2 
L3  ...  LD for all ν on the support. At sufficiently low p¯ or high µ, we have the opposite
ordering: LD  LD−1  LD−2  ...  L1. For moderate levels of prices and loss probabilities
things are more interesting: for each pair of deductible lotteries j < k there is a cutoff value
cj,k(x) in the interior of the risk-preference coefficient support. On the left of this cutoff the
higher deductible is preferred and on the right the lower deductible is preferred. In other
words, cj,k(x) is the unique coefficient of risk aversion that makes the DM indifferent between
Lj and Lk. Those with lower ν choose the riskier alternative Lj, while those with higher ν
choose the safer alternative Lk. Note that cj,k(x) is a continuous function, since the expected
utility from each deductible lottery is continuous in x as well as in ν.
3.2 The Model under Full Consideration
There is a continuum of DMs who face a choice among a finite number of alternatives,
i.e., the choice set, which is denoted D = {1, . . . , D}. Alternatives vary by their utility-
relevant characteristics. One characteristic, dj ∈ R, j ∈ D, is DM invariant. When it is
unambiguous, we may write dj instead of “alternative j”. Other characteristics, denoted
by xj ∈ Xj ⊂ Rq, may vary across DMs as well as across alternatives. That is, alternative
14Under CRRA, it is implied that DMs’ initial wealth is known to the researcher. Negligible Third
Derivative (NTD) utility is defined in Cohen & Einav (2007) and in Barseghyan et al. (2013).
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j is fully characterized by (dj, xj). We denote x = (x1, ..., xD) and X = X1 ⊗ ... ⊗ XD.
Given these characteristics, each DM’s preferences over the alternatives are defined by a
utility function Uν(d, x). The latter is fully described by a DM-specific index ν assumed
to be distributed according to F (·) over a bounded support Γ = [0, ν¯].15 We assume that
the random variables ν and x are independent (and that demographic variables, if available,
have been conditioned on). The DM’s draw of ν is not observed by the researcher and F (·)
is assumed to be continuous and otherwise left completely unspecified. Going forward, we
only consider models satisfying a basic Single Crossing Property, as defined below.
Definition 1 (Single Crossing Property). The DM’s preference relation over alternatives
satisfies the Single Crossing Property iff the following condition holds: For all j, k, j 6= k
there exists a continuous function cjk : X → R[−∞,∞] (or ckj : X → R[−∞,∞]) such that
Uν(dj, x) > Uν(dk, x) ∀ν ∈ (−∞, cjk(x))
Uν(dj, x) = Uν(dk, x) ν = cjk(x)
Uν(dj, x) < Uν(dk, x) ∀ν ∈ (cjk(x),∞).
That is, we require that the DM’s ranking of alternatives is monotone in ν: if a DM with a
certain degree of risk aversion prefers a safer (riskier) asset to a riskier (safer) one, then all
DMs with higher (lower) risk aversion also prefer the safer (riskier) asset.16
Full consideration is maintained in this subsection: each DM considers all alternatives in
the choice set and chooses the one with highest utility (that is, consideration and choice sets
coincide). Assumption 1 is a data requirement which guarantees this model’s identification:
There must be sufficient variation in a utility-relevant characteristic(s) to move the cutoffs
(the single crossing points in Definition 1) through the support for the preference coefficient.
Assumption 1 (Large Support). For all ν ∈ Γ there exists x ∈ X and alternative j such
that either: (1) cj,k(x) exists for all k 6= j and ν = mink 6=j cj,k(x); or (2) ck,j(x) exists for all
k 6= j and ν = maxk 6=j ck,j(x).
Theorem 1. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then F (·) is identified.
15We assume that while ν has bounded support, the utility function is well defined for any real valued ν.
16Since we allow the cutoffs to be infinite, our regularity condition does not exclude strongly dominated
choices, i.e. situations in which dk is preferred to dj for all values of ν. In the context of risk preferences this
definition of strong dominance is equivalent to first order stochastic dominance. When u(·) is restricted to
the class of concave utility functions strong dominance is equivalent to second order stochastic dominance.
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Proof. Fix any ν ∈ Γ. Find x and alternative j such that ν = mink 6=j cj,k(x) or ν =
maxk 6=j ck,j(x). Then one of the following is true:
F (ν) =F
(
min
k 6=j
cj,k(x)
)
= Pr(d = dj|x)
F (ν) =F
(
max
k 6=j
ck,j(x)
)
= 1− Pr(d = dj|x).
Since Pr(d = dj|x) is identified by the data, F (ν) is identified.
Theorem 1 is akin to the “full-support” identification result (Chamberlain, 1986; Heckman,
1990; Lewbel, 2016) and the intuition is straightforward: there must be sufficient variation
in the underlying exogenous characteristics to trace out the distribution of ν over its entire
support. Some variant of Assumption 1 is also necessary for identification. If, for example,
there exists an interval [ν∗, ν∗] ⊂ Γ such that for all k, j there is no x with ck,j(x) ∈ [ν∗, ν∗],
then F (·) will not be identified in this interval. Simply put, the data does not provide any
information about the distribution of the preference coefficient in this region.
Next, we present two models of limited consideration. Each of them has the same underlying
primitives as the benchmark model, except the consideration set formation is stochastic.
3.3 Alternative Specific Random Consideration Model
In the Alternative Specific Random Consideration (ARC) Model (Manski, 1977; Manzini
& Mariotti, 2014), each alternative dj appears in the consideration set with probability
ϕj independently of other alternatives. These probabilities are assumed to be the same
across DMs. We note that without loss of generality ϕj can be interpreted as a function
of exogenous characteristics (such as advertisement) that are not utility relevant. In such a
case, all of the results below should be interpreted as conditional on a given value of these
characteristics.17 Once the consideration set is drawn, the DM chooses the best alternative
according to her preferences. Given that each alternative is considered probabilistically,
it is possible that none of the alternatives enter the consideration set. In particular, with
probability
∏D
k=1(1−ϕk) the consideration set is empty. Hence, to close the model, we require
17More so, these characteristics may include a strict subset of x. As explained later, we only need one
element of x to have certain properties and be consideration irrelevant.
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a completion rule specifying the behavior of the DM in the case of non-consideration. We
offer four possible completion rules, each suited for application in different market settings.
Coin Toss: Assume ϕj < 1 for all j. Then there is positive probability that the DM does not
consider any alternative. In such a case, the DM randomly uniformly picks one alternative
from the choice set, i.e. each alternative has probability 1
D
of being chosen. Coin Toss is
consistent with scenarios in which DMs must choose an alternative (e.g. a deductible when
buying home insurance), but lack the desire or ability to meaningfully evaluate them.18
Default Option: Assume ϕj < 1 for all j. If no alternative is considered, the DM chooses a
preset alternative. This completion rule is applicable to scenarios where, without the DM’s
active choice, she is assigned a pre-specified alternative from the choice set (e.g. employer
provided benefits such as 401k allocations and medical insurance).
Preferred Options (Manski, 1977): Some alternative(s) is (are) always considered, i.e.
ϕj = 1 for some j. The identity of these alternatives does not have to be known to the
researcher. However, if there exist multiple j’s such that ϕj = 1, then these alternatives
should be adjacent to each other in the following sense. If there exists an x such that for
all ν ∈ Γ some non-preferred alternative dominates a preferred alternative, then it also
dominates all other preferred alternatives. This completion rule captures market scenarios
in which some alternatives are always discussed or emphasized by the sellers.
Outside Option (Manzini & Mariotti, 2014): Assume ϕj < 1 for all j. The first interpre-
tation of this rule is that all DMs who draw the empty set exit the market and are not part
of the data. A second interpretation of this rule is as follows. If the empty consideration set
is drawn, then the DM redraws a consideration set according to Equation (1) below. The
DM continues to draw consideration sets until a non-empty set is obtained.
For all completion rules, the probability that the consideration set takes realization K is
p(K) ≡
∏
dk∈K
ϕk
∏
dk∈D−K
(1− ϕk), ∀K ⊂ D. (1)
The differences in completion rules appear in the formulation of the likelihood function. A
computationally appealing way to write the likelihood function is to determine the proba-
bility that a DM with preference coefficient ν chooses alternative dj conditional on charac-
18In a classical IO setting, this type of completion rule is consistent with, for example, a shopper randomly
choosing a chip packet from the shelf without carefully evaluating the utility derived from consuming various
flavors of chips.
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teristics x. Suppose the consideration set is not empty. Then, if dj is chosen, it is in the
consideration set and every alternative that dominates it is not. Denote Bν(dj, x) the set of
alternatives that dominate dj for a DM with preference coefficient ν and characteristics x:
Bν(dj, x) ≡ {dk : Uν(dk, x) > Uν(dj, x)}.
It follows that for the first three completion rules
Pr(dj|x, ν) = ϕj
∏
dk∈Bν(dj ,x)
(1− ϕk) + rj,
where rj is the term that accounts for the possibility of an empty consideration set. Under
Coin Toss, rj =
1
D
∏
dk∈D(1 − ϕk). Under Default Option, rj =
∏
dk∈D(1 − ϕk) if j is
the default alternative and is zero otherwise. Finally, under Preferred Options, rj = 0.
Integrating over ν we have that
Pr(dj|x) =
∫
Pr(dj|x, ν)dF = ϕj
∫ ∏
dk∈Bν(dj ,x)
(1− ϕk)dF + rj.
Similarly, under Outside Option, we have that
Pr(dj|x) =
∫
Pr(dj|x, ν)dF = 1
1− rϕj
∫ ∏
dk∈Bν(dj ,x)
(1− ϕk)dF,
where r ≡∏dk∈D(1− ϕk).
We emphasize that these expressions for Pr(dj|x) do not require enumerating all possible
consideration sets, which for large choice sets can be hard if not infeasible. Computation of
Pr(dj|x) simply comes down to evaluating
I(dj|x) ≡
∫ ∏
dk∈Bν(dj ,x)
(1− ϕk)dF.
Given ϕ, the integrand
∏
dk∈Bν(dj ,x)(1 − ϕk) is piecewise constant in ν with at most D − 1
breakpoints, corresponding to indifference points between alternatives j and k (i.e. cj,k(x)
or ck,j(x)). There are at least two methods to compute this integral. First, for every dj and
x, we can directly compute the breakpoints and hence write I(dj|x) as a weighted sum:
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I(dj|x) =
D−1∑
h=0
(F (νh+1)− F (νh)) ∏
dk∈Bνh (dj ,x)
(1− ϕk)
 ,
where νh’s are the sequentially ordered breakpoints augmented by the integration endpoints:
ν0 = 0 and νD = ν¯. This expression is trivial to evaluate given F (·) and breakpoints
{νh}Dh=0. More importantly, since the breakpoints are invariant with respect to consideration
probabilities, they are computed only once. This simplifies the likelihood maximization
routine by orders of magnitude, as each evaluation of the objective function involves a
summation over products with at most D terms. A second approach is to compute I(dj|x)
using Riemann approximation:
I(dj|x) ≈ ν¯
M
M∑
m=1
f(νm) ∏
dk∈Bνm (dj ,x)
(1− ϕk)
 ,
where M is the number of intervals in the approximating sum, ν¯
M
is the intervals’ length,
νm’s are the intervals’ midpoints, and f(·) is the density of F (·). Again, one does not need
to evaluate the utility from different alternatives in the likelihood maximization. Instead,
one a priori computes the utility rankings for each νm, m = 1, . . . ,M .
19 These rankings
determine Bνm(dj, x). The likelihood maximization is now a standard search routine over
{ϕk}Dk=1 and density f(·). Our theory restricts f(·) to the class of continuous functions. In
practice, the search is over a class of non-parametric estimators for f(·).20 If the density is
parameterized, i.e. f(νm) ≡ f(νm, θ), then the maximization is over {ϕk}Dk=1 and θ ∈ Θ.
Note also that νm’s are the same across all DMs, further reducing computational burden.
21
3.4 Random Consideration Level Model
In the Random Consideration Level (RCL) Model, the consideration set forms in two steps.
In the first step, each DM draws a consideration level, l, that is independent of the preference
coefficient ν. The consideration level determines the size of the consideration set and it takes
discrete values in {1, ..., D} with probability φl such that
∑D
l=1 φl = 1. In the second step,
19The resulting computational gains are exploited in importance sampling (e.g., Ackerberg, 2009).
20One could, for example, use normalized B-splines or a mixture of flexible distributions.
21Depending on the class of f(·), it may be more accurate to compute I(dj |x) by substituting ν¯M f(νm)
with F (νm)− F (νm), where νm and νm are the endpoints of the corresponding interval.
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the consideration set is formed by drawing alternatives uniformly without replacement from
the choice set until the DM obtains a set with cardinality equal to the consideration level l.
The probability that the consideration set takes realization K of size l is p(K|l) = (D
l
)−1
.
A computationally appealing way to write the likelihood function is as follows. First, consider
a DM with a preference coefficient ν and characteristics x and suppose that dj is her m
th-best
alternative. The probability that dj is chosen is given by
Ql,m =

(D−ml−1 )
(Dl )
if 1 ≤ m ≤ D − l + 1
0 otherwise.
Denote bν(dj, x) the number of alternatives that dominate dj for an individual with prefer-
ence coefficient ν and characteristics x: bν(dj, x) ≡ card(Bν(dj, x)).22 We can write
Pr(dj|x) =
∫
Pr(dj|x, ν)dF =
∫ D∑
l=1
φlQl,1+bν(dj ,x)dF. (2)
We employ similar techniques as those in Section 3.3 to compute the integral in Equation 2.
4 Identification
4.1 Identification: An Example
Recall our example in Section 3.1. Suppose there are only two alternatives: d1 is the high
deductible and d2 is the low deductible. From Theorem 1 it is clear that to identify the
model under full consideration we need enough variation in p¯ (and/or µ) such that the cutoff
c1,2(x) covers the entire support of the preference coefficient. Here, this variation is sufficient
to identify both the consideration parameters and the distribution of the risk preferences.
We start with the ARC Model under one of the first three completion rules.23 For each value
22In the ARC model the identity of the alternatives dominating j matters, while in this model only the
number of dominating alternatives matter. The reason is that here all alternatives have equal probability of
being considered. E.g., suppose that D is 5 and j is the second best alternative, so that b(j|x, ν) = 1. The
second-best alternative is never chosen under full consideration, so that Q5,1 = 0. Under consideration level
4, the second best is chosen when the first best is not considered, which happens with probability 15 , that is
Q4,1 =
1
5 . Under consideration level 1 an alternative is chosen iff it is in the consideration set, i.e. Q1,1 =
1
5 .
23Identification under the Outside Default follows similar reasoning.
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of x we have a single moment identified by the data:
Pr(d = d1|x) = ϕ1ϕ2F (c1,2(x)) + ϕ1(1− ϕ2) + r1. (3)
The first term on the RHS of the Equation 3 captures the case where both alternatives are
considered, and hence d1 is chosen only if the preference coefficient is below the cutoff. The
second term captures the case where only d1 is considered, and thus it is chosen for all values
of ν. The third term is zero if at least one option is always considered, and otherwise captures
the possibility that the consideration set is empty, and, depending on the completion rule,
r1 is equal to either
1
2
(1 − ϕ1)(1 − ϕ2) or (1 − ϕ1)(1 − ϕ2). Hence, rather than having a
one-to-one mapping between Pr(d = d1|x) and F (c1,2(x)) that would identify the latter as
in Theorem 1, we have two additional unknown parameters. However, when Assumption 1
holds, we can find x0 and x1 such that c1,2(x
0) = 0 and c1,2(x
1) = ν¯. This implies that the
consideration parameters are the solution to the following system of equations:
Pr(d = d1|x0) = ϕ1(1− ϕ2) + r1
Pr(d = d1|x1) = ϕ1 + r1.
It is straightforward to show that this system has a unique solution. Hence, identification
relies on the assumption that variation in x is sufficient to generate values for the cutoff
c1,2(x) at the extremes of the support for the preference coefficient, which is also needed for
identification in the model with full consideration as discussed in Section 3.2.24 Once the
consideration parameters are known, identification of F (·) follows from Equation (3), as long
as both ϕ1 and ϕ2 are strictly positive.
25
Similarly, under the RCL Model, for each value of x we have a single moment identified by
the data:
Pr(d = d1|x) = φ2F (c1,2(x)) + 1
2
φ1 = (1− φ1)F (c1,2(x)) + 1
2
φ1. (4)
Again, under Assumption 1, we can drive c1,2(x) either to zero or to ν¯, which turns the
24Since observed variation in characteristics x identifies the distribution of a latent variable, x is referred
to as the Lewbel special regressor (Lewbel, 2000, 2014).
25If either ϕ1 = 0 or ϕ2 = 0 then choice frequencies do not depend on x and nothing can be learned about
the distribution of ν as F (c1,2(x)) drops out of Equation (3).
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expression above into an equation with one unknown, namely φ1. Hence the consideration
parameters are identified. As long as φ1 < 1, identification of F (·) follows.
The notable difference between Equations (3) and (4) is that the latter contains only one con-
sideration parameter, while the former contains two. The reason follows from the restriction
that the φ’s sum to one, while no restriction is imposed on the sum of ϕ’s. To compensate
for this missing moment condition in the ARC Model, the identification argument requires
the use of an additional moment. This is the reason why identification of the ARC model
will require somewhat stronger conditions.
In sum, using values of x that put the cutoff at the extremes of the preference-coefficient space
allows for identification of the consideration parameters. Once the consideration parameters
are known, variation in x pins down the preference-coefficient distribution. In the next
two sections we proceed with formal arguments for identification of limited consideration
parameters in both models. The conditions for identification of the preference-coefficient
distribution are described in Section 4.3.
4.2 Identification of Consideration Parameters
We begin with the ARC model. We relegate all proofs to Appendix A.
Theorem 2. Consider the Coin Toss or Outside Option completion rule. Suppose that
there exist x0, x1, and a non-identity permutation {o1, o2, ..., oD} of the choice set such that
∀ν ∈ [0, ν¯]
L1(x
0)  L2(x0)  · · ·  LD(x0),
Lo1(x
1)  Lo2(x1)  · · ·  LoD(x1).
Then the consideration parameters {ϕ1, ϕ2, ..., ϕD} are identified.
While it appears that Theorem 2 (and the other results in this section) make use of the
particular ordering of alternatives at x0, the theorem can be stated with respect to any
ordering of the available alternatives. The intuition for Theorem 2 is as follows. We need
to identify D parameters. Since the preference ordering is deterministic at x0, the observed
choice frequencies provide D − 1 distinct moments. The last distinct moment is obtained
from the choice frequency evaluated at x1 for an alternative that moved position in the
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preference order (guaranteed by the permutation). Note that the conditions of the theorem
allow for the presence of both dominated and dominating choices (choices that are better
or worse than another alternative(s) regardless of the value of x). For example, in both
preference orderings the best (or the worst) D − 2 choices may be the same at x0 and x1,
but the remaining two alternatives switch places.
Theorem 3. Consider the Default Option completion rule. Denote dn the default option.
Suppose that: (1) There exist x0, x1 and a non-identity permutation {o1, o2, ..., oD} of the
choice set such that ∀ν ∈ [0, ν¯]
L1(x
0)  L2(x0)  · · ·  LD(x0),
Lo1(x
1)  Lo2(x1)  · · ·  LoD(x1).
(2) There exists an alternative dj 6= dn such that Ln(x0)  Lj(x0), Lj(x1)  Ln(x1), and
Pr(dj|x1) > 0.26 Then the consideration parameters {ϕ1, ϕ2, ..., ϕD} are identified.
The only difference between the conditions in Theorems 2 and 3 is in the latter case we ad-
ditionally require an alternative, which is considered with positive probability, that switches
rankings with the default option between x0 and x1. This is necessary to obtain information
about the consideration parameter for the default option. To see why this must be the case,
suppose that the default option is dD. Given the ranking of options at x = x
0, it is immediate
to see how ϕ1, . . . , ϕD−1 are identified sequentially since Pr(d = dj|x0) = ϕj
∏
k<j(1−ϕk).27
However, we cannot learn ϕD since the last moment at x
0 is redundant and in particular
does not reveal any information about ϕD:
Pr(d = dD|x0) = ϕD
∏
k<D
(1− ϕk) + r = ϕD
∏
k<D
(1− ϕk) +
∏
k≤D
(1− ϕk) =
∏
k<D
(1− ϕk).
Now suppose dD is dominated by all other alternatives at x
1 (so that there does not exist a
dj 6= dn satisfying the assumption in Theorem 3). By the same logic as above, Pr(d = dD|x1)
does not reveal ϕD.
28
Theorem 4. Consider the Preferred Options completion rule. Denote dn, dn+1 . . . , dn to
26The condition Pr(dj |x1) > 0 (or Pr(dj |x0) > 0) is equivalent to assuming ϕj > 0. A restriction on the
data is testable, so the assumption Pr(dj |x1) > 0 is more appealing.
27We have that ϕ1 = Pr(d = d1|x0), ϕ2 = Pr(d=d2|x
0)
1−ϕ1 , etc.
28Of course, in this example, if dD is always dominated, one may not care about learning ϕD, since it
does not affect the probability of any other alternative being chosen.
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be the preferred options for some n and n. Suppose that: (1) There exist x0, x1 and a
non-identity permutation {o1, o2, ..., oD} of the choice set such that ∀ν ∈ [0, ν¯]
L1(x
0)  L2(x0)  · · ·  LD(x0),
Lo1(x
1)  Lo2(x1)  · · ·  LoD(x1).
(2) That ∀j > n we have j′ < minn′∈{n′,...,n′} n′ where oj′ = j, on′ = n, . . . , on′ = n. Then the
consideration parameters {ϕ1, ϕ2, ..., ϕD} are identified.
The additional restriction for identification under Preferred Options completion rule vis-a`-vis
Coin Toss is that all alternatives must dominate the preferred options at either x0 or x1. The
second condition in Theorem 4 identifies the highest ranked preferred option at x0, namely
dn. Since ϕn is equal to one, for j > n the choice frequency is zero at x
0.29 If, contrary to
the second condition, dj is also dominated by a preferred option at x
1, then by the same
logic its choice frequency is zero and hence the consideration parameter ϕj is not identified.
We close this section by making two remarks. First, Theorems 2–4 yield the following
condition that guarantees identification under any completion rule:
Corollary 1. If there exist x0 and x1 such that ∀ν ∈ [0, ν¯]
L1(x
0)  L2(x0)  · · ·  LD(x0),
LD(x
1)  LD−1(x1)  · · ·  L1(x1),
then the consideration parameters {ϕ1, ϕ2, ..., ϕD} are identified under all completion rules.
Second, Theorems 2–4 are indeed only sufficient: depending on the completion rule and
x’s, there are other conditions that yield identification. For example, the following theorem
follows from the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3:
Theorem 5. Consider the Coin Toss, Default Option or Outside Option completion rule. If
there exist x0 and x1 such that ∀ν ∈ [0, ν¯]
L1(x
0)  L2(x0)  · · ·  LD(x0),
Lj(x
1)  L1(x1) ∀j 6= 1, (or LD(x1)  Lj(x1) ∀j 6= D),
then the consideration parameters {ϕ1, ϕ2, ..., ϕD} are identified.
29This follows because Pr(d = dj |x0) = ϕj
∏
k<j(1− ϕk) = ϕj × 0 = 0.
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More generally, the identification of consideration parameters comes down to the following:
Theorem 6. Suppose there exist {x0, x1, ..., xM} and Smj ⊂ {1, 2, ...D} such that ∀j ∈
{1, ..., D} and ∀ν ∈ [0, ν¯]
Li(x
m)  Lj(xm)  Lk(xm), ∀i ∈ Smj & ∀k ∈ D \ Smj ,
then the consideration parameters {ϕ1, ϕ2, ..., ϕD} form a system of equations in D un-
knowns. If this system admits a unique solution, then consideration parameters are identified.
The theorem requires that for each alternative dj there is some x
m that preserves the ranking
of dj relative to all other alternatives regardless of the value of the preference parameter.
When this is the case, the observed choice frequency of alternative dj conditional on x
m
is a function of the consideration parameters, but not the preference distribution. Hence,
for each dj we obtain an equation(s) in consideration parameters. If the system of these
equations has a unique solution, identification follows. Finally, each set of assumptions in
Theorems 2, 3, and 4 guarantee that the aforementioned system of equations exists and that
it has a unique solution.
The identifying conditions for the RCL model are similar to those of the ARC model. The
conditions are, however, weaker as the RCL model imposes the additional restriction that
the consideration parameters must sum to one:
∑D
j=1 φj = 1. For example, the following
theorem is the analog of Theorem 2:
Theorem 7. If there exist x0 such that ∀ν ∈ [0, ν¯]
L1(x
0)  L2(x0)  · · ·  LD(x0),
then the consideration parameters {φ1, φ2, ..., φD} are identified.
4.3 Identification of the preference-coefficient distribution
To set the stage, it is useful to extend our example in Section 4.1 to the case of three
alternatives: d1 is the high deductible, d2 is the medium deductible, and d3 is the low
deductible. We have that
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Pr(d = d1|x) =ϕ1ϕ2ϕ3F (min{c1,2(x), c1,3(x)}) + ϕ1ϕ2(1− ϕ3)F (c1,2(x))+
ϕ1ϕ3(1− ϕ2)F (c1,3(x)) + ϕ1(1− ϕ2)(1− ϕ3) + r1. (5)
The first term in the sum above captures the case where all three alternatives are considered,
and hence alternative d1 is chosen only if the preference coefficient is below both c1,2(x) and
c1,3(x). The second term is the case that alternatives d1 and d2 are considered, but alternative
d3 is not considered, so that alternative d1 is chosen only if the preference coefficient is below
the cutoff between alternatives d1 and d2. Only alternatives d1 and d3 are considered in
the third term, only d1 is considered in the fourth term, and no alternative are considered
in the last term. Note that even though the consideration parameters are point identified
(and hence ϕj can be treated as data), one moment of the data, Pr(d = d1|x), is associated
with F (·) evaluated at two different points, c1,2(x) and c1,3(x).30 If we had variation in x
that effectively shut downs one of the cutoffs (e.g. it drives c1,3(x) to either zero or to ν¯)
without affecting the other cutoff, then we would restore a one-to-one mapping between a
moment in the data and a value of F (·) at a single cutoff. In certain markets this type of
variation is possible: For example, the price of the lowest deductible alternative is sufficiently
large so that the alternative is strictly dominated. In the insurance context, however, it
is rare to observe this type of variation, as the prices for all alternatives tend to move
together. We show in Theorem 8 that F (·) is identified under much weaker conditions,
that do not rely on independent variation in characteristics of single alternatives. The
intuition for our result can be gleaned from Equation (5). Suppose we start with a value
for the characteristics x˜0 such that c1,2(x˜
0) is close to the boundary, with c1,2(x˜
0) < ν¯ but
c1,3(x˜
0) > ν¯. Then, since F (c1,3(x˜
0)) = 1, Pr(d = d1|x˜0) pins down F (c1,2(x˜0)). Next
take x˜1 such that c1,3(x˜
1) = c1,2(x˜
1). Since F (c1,3(x˜
1)) is known, Pr(d = d1|x˜1) identifies
F (c1,2(x˜
1)). Repeat these steps to construct a sequence {x˜n}Nn=1 such that c1,2(x˜N) ≤ 0. For
this approach to work, in addition to having sufficient variation in x to cover the support
of ν, we must also require that c1,3(x) does not “catch up” to c1,2(x) (i.e. c1,2(x) < c1,3(x)
whenever c1,2(x) ∈ Γ),31 so that our iteration reaches the other extreme of the support.
In sum, our strategy for identifying the preference-coefficient distribution is to (1) identify
30Bringing into the analysis another moment, e.g. Pr(d = d2|x), does not help as that brings with itself
evaluation of F (·) at another point, c2,3(x).
31That is, a DM with a preference coefficient in the interior of the parameter space cannot be indifferent
between more than two alternatives.
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the distribution of the preference coefficient close to one of the extremes of the support and
then (2) move iteratively towards the other extreme. We summarize the variation in cj,k(·)
induced by x that we need in the following assumption:
Assumption 2 (Large Support for the Cutoff). Let cj(x) ≡ mink 6=j cj,k(x) and c¯j(x) ≡
maxk 6=j ck,j(x). There exist x0, x1, and a continuous function x(t), x(t) ∈ X , x(0) = x0,
x(1) = x1, t ∈ [0, 1], and an alternative j such that
A1. cj,k(x(t)) exists ∀k;
A2. cj(x
0) = 0 and cj(x
1) = ν¯;
A3. arg mink 6=j cj,k(x(t)) is
unique ∀t ∈ [0, 1].
OR
B1. ck,j(x(t)) exists ∀k;
B2. c¯j(x
0) = 0 and c¯j(x
1) = ν¯;
B3. arg maxk 6=j cj,k(x(t)) is
unique ∀t ∈ [0, 1].
Theorem 8 (Identification under Limited Consideration). Suppose in the ARC model or
in the RCL model the limited consideration parameters are identified and let Assumption 2
hold for some j. Furthermore, for the ARC model suppose for some k 6= j that ϕj > 0 and
ϕk > 0. For the RCL model suppose φ1 < 1. Then F (·) is identified.
Theorem 8 relies on variation in the choice probability of one particular alternative to identify
F (·). Hence, forD > 2, both ARC and RCL models are over-identified and therefore testable:
in either one Pr(d = dm|x(t)) is pinned down by given consideration parameters and F (·). If
the model is correctly specified, it must then be that the predicted Pr(d = dm|x(t)) coincides
with the data.
5 Models’ Properties
5.1 Parallels with the RUM
We focus on a standard application of the RUM with full consideration in the context of
our example in Section 3.1. The final evaluation of the utility that the DM derives from
alternative j now includes a separately additive error term:
Vν(Lj(x)) = EUν(Lj(x)) + εj, (6)
where, as before, ν captures unobserved heterogeneity in preferences. We emphasize that
in the standard RUM εj is assumed independent of the random coefficients (in this applica-
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tion, the DM’s risk-preference coefficient ν) as well as of the observable covariates (in this
application, x = (p¯, µ)).
Typical implementations of this model further specify that εj is identically and indepen-
dently distributed across alternatives (and DMs) with a Type 1 Extreme Value distribution,
following the seminal work of McFadden (1974). This yields a Mixed Logit model that differs
from, for example, McFadden & Train (2000) because in the latter the random coefficient(s)
enter the utility function linearly, while in the context of expected utility models the random
preference coefficient(s) enter nonlinearly. We now discuss two properties of Model (6) that
hinder its applicability to the analysis of random expected utility models, and then illustrate
how models ARC and RCL are immune from these problems.
Coupling utility functions in the hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) family, for ex-
ample, CARA or CRRA, with a Type 1 Extreme Value distributed additive error, yields:
Property 1 (Non-monotonicity of RUM-predicted choice probabilities in the coefficient of
risk aversion). In Model (6) with εj i.i.d. Type 1 Extreme Value, as the DM’s risk aversion
increases, the probability that she chooses a riskier alternative declines at first, but eventually
starts to increase (Apesteguia & Ballester, 2018).32
To see why, consider two non-dominated alternatives dj and dk such that dj is riskier than dk.
A risk neutral DM prefers dj to dk and hence will choose the former with higher probability.
As the risk aversion increases, the DM eventually becomes indifferent between dj and dk and
chooses either of these alternatives with equal probability (with probability equal to 0.5 when
there are only two alternatives). As the risk aversion increases further, she prefers dk to dj
and hence chooses the latter with lower probability. However, as the risk aversion gets even
larger, the expected utility of any lottery with finite stakes converges to zero. Consequently,
the choice probabilities of all alternatives, regardless of their riskiness, converge to each
other, again 0.5 with two alternatives.33 Hence, to “climb back” to 0.5, at some point the
probability of choosing dj becomes increasing in risk aversion. A careful anatomy of this
phenomenon reveals that it originates with the variance of the additive error term εj being
independent of ν, a feature that is inescapable in Mixed Logit models.
Next, we establish the relation between utility differences across two alternatives and their
32See also Wilcox (2008).
33Recall that in the Mixed Logit the magnitude of the utility differences is tied to differences in (log)
choice probabilities, EUν(Lk(x)) − EUν(Lj(x)) = log(Pr(d = dk|x, ν)) − log(Pr(d = dj |x, ν)), so that as
ν →∞ the choice probabilities are predicted to be all equal.
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respective choice probabilities. Because our random expected utility model features unob-
served preference heterogeneity, we work with an analog of the rank order property in Manski
(1975) that is conditional on ν:
Definition 2. (Conditional Rank Order of Choice Probabilities) The model yields conditional
rank order of the choice probabilities if for given ν and for any DM and alternatives j, k ∈ D,
EUν(Lj(x)) > EUν(Lk(x))⇔ Pr(d = dj|x, ν) > Pr(d = dk|x, ν).
The standard Mixed Logit model yields conditional rank ordering of the choice probabilities
given ν.34 In turn, we show that the conditional rank order property implies the following
upper bound on the probability that suboptimal alternatives are chosen:
Property 2. (Generalized Dominance) Consider any characteristics x, alternative s, and
set J ⊂ D \ {s} satisfying: ∀ν, ∃jν ∈ J s.t. EUν(Ls(x)) < EUν(Ljν (x)). Then
Pr(d = ds|x) <
∑
k∈J
Pr(d = dk|x).
Hence, in the standard Mixed Logit model, where the conditional rank order property holds,
if for all preference coefficients an alternative s is dominated either by alternative j or by
alternative k, then the probability of observing s is predicted to be less than the sum of the
probabilities of observing j or k. We remark that neither j nor k is required to be optimal
in D, hence the upper bound in Property 2 is non-trivial.
5.2 Monotonicity in Models ARC and RCL
We now formally prove that both the ARC model and the RCL model yield predicted choice
probabilities that are monotone in the coefficient of risk aversion. We begin by defining
monotonicity for situations in which there are more than two alternatives in the choice set.
Property 3. (Generalized Monotone Preference Property) Consider any x and suppose that
34Manski (1975) establishes the rank order property for additive error random utility models (without
random coefficients) for a broader class of models that only require very weak restrictions on εj . Conditional
on ν, his results extend immediately to yield the conditional rank order property.
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cj,k(x) exists for all 1 ≤ j < k ≤ D. Then, for any ν1 < ν2 and J ∈ {1, 2, ..., D}:
Pr
(
J⋃
j=1
dj
∣∣∣∣x, ν1
)
≥ Pr
(
J⋃
j=1
dj
∣∣∣∣x, ν2
)
.
The property above states that when alternatives are ordered so that those with lower index
are more risky (that is, cj,k(x) exists for all 1 ≤ j < k ≤ D), the probability of choosing one
of the J riskiest alternatives declines as the preference coefficient increases.
Fact 1. The ARC and RCL Models satisfy the Generalized Monotone Preference Property.
The proof of this fact (and of the ones stated in the next section) is given in Appendix B.
5.3 Ordinal Properties of Models ARC and RCL
In the Mixed Logit model, the cardinality of the differences in the (random) expected utility
of alternatives plays a crucial role in the determination of choice probabilities, as it interacts
with the realization of the additive error whose variance cannot be a function of ν. We now
show that both of our models can be recast as an Ordinal Random Utility Model (ORUM) in
which only the ordinal and not the cardinal ranking of alternatives based on their expected
utility affects DMs’ choices. In contrast to the Mixed Logit, we have:
Fact 2. The ARC and RCL Models exhibit the following type of scale invariance: any mul-
tiplication of Uν(·) by an arbitrary non-negative function of ν leaves the model’s predictions
unchanged.
Hence, to turn these models into models with additive error, the errors must have a very
particular structure.
Fact 3. (ARC Model as ORUM) The ARC Model is equivalent to an additive error random
utility model with unobserved preference heterogeneity where all alternatives are considered,
the DM’s utility associated with each alternative j ∈ {1, ..., D} is given by
Vν(dj, x) = Uν(dj, x) + εj,
24
and εj is a random variable such that:
εj =
0 with probability ϕj−∞ with probability (1− ϕj).
The error terms are independent of (x, ν) and across alternatives. Ties, in case εj takes on
−∞ value ∀j, are broken according to the completion rule as specified in Section 3.3.
Fact 4. (RCL Model as ORUM) The RCL Model is equivalent to an additive error random
utility model with unobserved preference heterogeneity where all alternatives are considered,
the DM’s utility associated with each alternative j ∈ {1, ..., D} is given by
Vν(dj, x) = Uν(dj, x) + εj,
and εj is a random variable that takes two values: 0 and −∞. The joint distribution of
ε=(ε1, ε2, ..., εD) is as follows. For every realization e that has at least one zero element:
p(e) =
φl(
D
l
) , where l = ∑
k
1(ek = 0).
and for e = {−∞,−∞, . . . ,−∞}: p(e) = 0.
The structure of the additive errors derived in Fact 3 and 4, respectively, allow us to learn
which of these models satisfy the conditional rank order property, and hence the Generalized
Dominance Property.
Fact 5. The ARC Model does not (always) satisfy the Conditional Rank Order Property and,
hence, the Generalized Dominance.
Fact 6. The RCL Model satisfies the Conditional Rank Order Property and, hence, Gener-
alized Dominance.
We summarize this section with Table 1, that lists the differences across the Mixed Logit,
ARC, and RCL models. The first panel lists the differences in the assumptions and the
second panel lists the differences in implied properties.
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Table 1 Model Comparisons
Mixed Logit ARC RCL
Error Distribution
Support R {−∞, 0} {−∞, 0}
Independent of x Yes Yes Yes
Independent of ν Yes Yes Yes
Independent across alternatives Yes Yes No
Identical across alternatives Yes No Yes
Properties
Monotonicity No Yes Yes
Conditional Rank Order Property Yes No Yes
Generalized Dominance Yes No Yes
6 Beyond the ARC and RCL Models
As shown above, the ARC and RCL models are complimentary in terms of consideration
set formation if viewed through the lens of an error structure corresponding to an ORUM.
Each model relaxes an assumption imposed on the error structure (either independence or
identically distributed). Yet identification of these models rests on a similar logic. We
conjecture that other consideration models that relax both the independence and identi-
cally distributed assumptions can also be identified. While it is beyond the scope of this
paper to argue which consideration set formation is the right one in a given context, we
offer two additional examples of consideration set formation based on well established eco-
nomic/behavioral phenomena. The first example captures economic situations in which a
DM will consider alternatives with an attribute that is below a certain DM specific threshold
(Kimya, 2018). Within the insurance context, a threshold on the deductible level attribute
will arise immediately if there are DM specific (unobserved) liquidity constraints: Anticipat-
ing that her liquidity constraint might bind if a loss occurs, a forward looking DM discards
high deductible alternatives from the consideration set.35 The second mechanism builds on
the notion of extremeness aversion, one way Behavioral Economics and Marketing litera-
ture addresses the context dependency of preferences. Simonson & Tversky (1992) define
extremeness aversion as the situation when “the attractiveness of an option is enhanced if
it is an intermediate option in the choice set and is diminished if it is an extreme option”.
In our framework, the relative location of the alternative in the choice set will determine its
35For a discussion on how liquidity constraints affect households’ risk aversion see Chetty & Szeidl (2007).
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likelihood of being considered.
6.1 The Threshold Model
We return to our example in Section 3.1. Suppose that DMs find it prohibitively costly
to have out-of pocket expenses above certain DM-specific limit. Hence there is an upper
bound on what deductibles they consider. Formally, we assume that, in addition to the
preference parameter ν, each DM has an unobserved threshold parameter d. The DM’s
draw of the threshold parameter defines her consideration set. In particular, alternative dk
is considered if and only if dk < d.
36 We assume that ν and d are independent conditional
on observables (e.g., wealth, credit score, and age), and that the threshold parameter is
continuously distributed G(d) with support (dD,∞).
Let ξ1 = 1−G(d1), ξ2 = G(d1)−G(d2), . . . , ξD−2 = G(dD−3)−G(dD−2), and ξD−1 = G(dD−2).
Then the fraction of DMs considering all deductibles is ξ1, considering all but the highest
deductible is ξ2, and considering only the lowest deductible is ξD. F (ν) and {ξ1, ξ2, ..., ξD−1}
are identified provided sufficient variation in p and/or µ, as discussed above, exists. Indeed,
consider DMs with x0 = (p0, µ0) such that the deductibles are ranked from the highest to
the lowest for all ν on the support. Then ξk is equal to Pr(d = dk|x0), which is identified by
the data. Identification of F (ν) follows from similar arguments made in Theorem 8.
6.2 Extremeness Aversion Model
Consider again example in Section 3.1. To ease notation we assume that the number of
alternatives in the choice set, D, is odd and we let m = D+1
2
. All DMs consider the median
alternative dm with probability equal to one. The remaining alternatives are considered with
probability that is decreasing in the distance from the median alternative. In particular, the
consideration set is formed according to the following product rule:
Pr(dk is considered) =

∏k
j=m+1 ξj if k > m∏m−1
j=k ξj if k < m
.
36Recall that deductibles are decreasing in k, and hence dD is the smallest deductible providing maximum
coverage.
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Table 2 Premiums Quantiles for the $500
Deductible
Quantiles 0.01 0.05 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.95 0.99
Collision 53 74 117 162 227 383 565
Comprehensive 29 41 69 99 141 242 427
Home 211 305 420 540 743 1,449 2,524
As before, consideration set formation is independent ν conditional on observables. Suppose
that there is sufficient variation in p and/or µ so that there exists DMs with x0 = (p0, µ0)
such that the deductibles are ranked from the highest to the lowest for all ν on the support.
Then ξk is equal to the ratio
Pr(dk|x0)
Pr(dk−1|x0) , which is identified by the data.
7 Application
7.1 Data
We study households’ deductible choices across three lines of property insurance: auto col-
lision, auto comprehensive, and home all perils. The data come from a U.S. insurance com-
pany. Our analysis uses a sample of 7,736 households who purchased their auto and home
policies for the first time between 2003 and 2007 and within six months of each other. We
only consider their first purchases.37 Table E.1 provides descriptive statistics for households’
observable characteristics, which we use later to estimate households preference coefficients.38
For each household and each coverage we observe the exact menu of alternatives available at
the time of the purchase. The deductible alternatives vary across coverages but not across
households. Table E.2 presents the frequency of chosen deductibles in our data.
Premiums are determined coverage-by-coverage as in the example from Section 3.1. For
each household, the company determines a baseline price p¯ using a coverage-specific rating
function, which takes into account the household’s coverage-relevant characteristics and any
applicable discounts. Given p¯, the premium for alternative j is determined based on a
37The dataset is an updated version of the one used in Barseghyan et al. (2013). It contains information
for an additional year of data and puts stricter restrictions on the timing of purchases across different lines.
These restrictions are meant to minimize potential biases stemming from non-active choices, such as policy
renewals, and temporal changes in socioeconomic conditions.
38These are the same variables that are used in Barseghyan et al. (2013) to control for households’
characteristics. See discussion there for additional details.
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Table 3 Claim Probabilities Across Contexts
Quantiles 0.01 0.05 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.95 0.99
Collision 0.036 0.045 0.062 0.077 0.096 0.128 0.156
Comprehensive 0.005 0.008 0.014 0.021 0.030 0.045 0.062
Home 0.024 0.032 0.048 0.064 0.084 0.130 0.183
coverage-specific rule, pj = gj · p¯+ δ. Table E.5 reports the average premium by context and
deductible, and Table 2 summarizes the premium distributions for the $500 deductible. As
the latter table shows, premiums vary dramatically. In each coverage, the 99th percentile of
the $500 deductible is more than ten times the corresponding 1st percentile.
The underlying loss probabilities are derived from expected claim rates that are estimated
using coverage-by-coverage Poisson-Gamma Bayesian credibility models applied to a large
auxiliary panel. The unbalanced panel contains over 400,000 households from 1998 to 2007,
yielding more than 1.3 million household-year observations for each coverage. We assume
that household i’s claims under coverage j in year t follow a Poisson distribution with arrival
rate λijt. We treat λijt as latent random variables and assume that lnλijt = W
′
ijtζj + ij,
where Wijt is a vector of observables, ij is an unobserved i.i.d. error term, and exp(ij)
follows a Gamma distribution with unit mean and variance ηj.
39 Poisson panel regressions
with random effects yield estimates of ζj and ηj for each coverage j. For each household i,
we use the regression estimates to generate a predicted claim rate λ̂ij for each coverage j,
conditional on the household’s ex ante characteristics Wij and ex post claims experience. In
the model, we assume that households expect no more than one claim.40 Hence, we transform
λ̂ij into a predicted claim probability µ̂ij = 1 − exp(−λ̂ij). Predicted claim probabilities
(summarized in Table 3) exhibit extreme variation: The 99th percentile claim probability in
collision (comprehensive and home) is 4.3 (12 and 7.6) times higher than the corresponding
1st percentile. Finally, the correlation between claim probabilities and premiums for the
$500 deductible is 0.38 for collision, 0.15 for comprehensive, and 0.11 for home all perils.
Hence there is independent variation in both.41
39We refer to this model as a Bayesian credibity model because λˆ corresponds to the Bayesian credibility
premium in the actuarial literature (Denuit, Mare´chal, Pitrebois, & Walhin, 2007, Ch 3).
40The claim rates are small and, consequently, the likelihood of two or more claims is small. For home
insurance 86.2% of predicted claim rates in the core sample are less than 0.1 and 97.4% percent are less
than 0.15. For collision the frequencies are 79.8% and 98.6%, respectively. For comprehensive – 99.95% and
100%.
41See Barseghyan et al. (2013) (and Cohen & Einav (2007) in the context of Israeli auto insurance) for a
detailed discussion of where such independent variation comes from.
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7.2 The Model
The model is identical to the one in Section 3.1, augmented with either the ARC or the RCL
Model. As in the example, the DM’s problem amounts to choice over deductible lotteries of
the form Lk(x) ≡ (−pk, 1− µ;−pk − dk, µ), where x = (p¯, µ). The utility function is assumed
to be CARA. For all ν > 0:
EUν(Lk(x)) = − (1− µ) e−ν(w−pk) − µe−ν(w−pk−dk) = −e−νw
[
(1− µ) eνpk + µeν(pk+dk)] ,
where w denotes the DM’s initial wealth.42 Note that e−νw enters multiplicatively in the
expression above and hence does not affect the rankings of the alternatives.
We now establish the assumptions required for the identification results in Corollary 1 and
Theorem 8.43 It is immediate to see that for any ν on a compact support, when p¯ is sufficiently
large and/or µ is close to zero, the preference ordering is sequential: EUν(L1) > EUν(L2) >
· · · > EUν(LD). Alternatively, when p¯ is small (and µ > 0) or µ is close to one (and p¯ is not
very large) we have that EUν(LD) > EUν(LD−1) > · · · > EUν(L1).
Turning to the identification of the preference-coefficient distribution, note that all cutoffs
exist and are continuous functions of x = (p¯, µ). It remains to show that arg mink 6=1 c1,k(x)
is unique. To establish this, we show in Appendix C that c1,2(x) < c1,m(x) for any m > 2.
7.3 Estimation Results
7.3.1 The ARC Model: Collision
We start by presenting estimation results in a simple setting where the only choice is the
collision deductible and observable demographics do not affect preferences. We do so to illus-
trate the key features of our method and to ascertain that multiple contexts and demographic
variables play no particular role in identification.
In this market there are no preset defaults for deductibles, which implies that Default Option
is not a proper completion rule for these data. We assume the Coin Toss completion rule.
The estimation under Coin Toss naturally encompasses Preferred Options – if estimated
42When ν is zero, expected utility is simply −pk − µdk.
43In Appendix C, we show that these assumptions are satisfied also under CRRA.
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values of one or more ϕj’s turn out to be one, then we have Preferred Options.
44 To execute
our estimation procedure we need to choose the upper bound of the preference-coefficient
support. We set it to ν¯ = 0.02, which is conservative (see Barseghyan, Molinari, & Teitel-
baum, 2016). We ex post verify that this does not affect our estimation by checking that the
density of the estimated distribution is close to zero at the upper bound. We approximate
F (·) non-parametrically through a mixture of Beta distributions. In practice, however, both
AIC/BIC criteria indicate that a single component is sufficient for our analysis.
The estimated distribution and consideration parameters are reported in Table F.1. As the
first panel in Figure 1 shows, the model closely matches the aggregate moments observed in
the data. The second panel in Figure 1 illustrates side-by-side the frequency of predicted
choices, consideration probabilities, and the distribution of households’ first-best alternative
(i.e., the distribution of optimal choices under full consideration). Predicted choices are
determined jointly by the preference induced ranking of deductibles and by the considera-
tion probabilities: Limited consideration forces households’ decision towards less desirable
outcomes by stochastically eliminating better alternatives. It is noteworthy that the two
highest deductibles ($1, 000 and $500) are considered at much higher frequency (1.00 and
0.92, respectively) than the other alternatives, suggesting that households have a tendency
to regularly pay attention to the cheaper items in the choice set. Yet, the most frequent
model-implied optimal choice under full consideration is the $250 deductible, which is con-
sidered with relatively low probability. In this application, assuming full consideration leads
to a significant downward bias in the estimation of the underlying risk preferences. To see
why, consider increasing the consideration probabilities for the lower deductibles to the same
levels as the $500 deductible. Holding risk preferences fixed, the likelihood that the lower
deductibles are chosen increases and therefore the higher deductibles are chosen with lower
probability. Average risk aversion must decline to compensate for this shift and to “push
back up” the likelihood function. This is exactly the pattern we find when we estimate a
near-full consideration model. In particular, we find that average risk aversion decreases by
about 34% from 0.0036 to 0.0024 when all consideration parameters equal 0.999.45 To put
these numbers into context, a DM with risk aversion equal to 0.0037 is willing to pay $424
to avoid a $1, 000 loss with probability 0.1, while a DM with risk aversion equal to 0.0027 is
only willing to pay $287 to avoid the loss.
44We could have also assumed Outside Default (under the second interpretation). The collision only
results under this completion rule are nearly identical to those presented in the paper.
45We cannot assume that all consideration probabilities are equal to one, since the $200 deductible is
dominated under full consideration and is chosen with positive probability.
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Figure 1: The ARC Model
The first panel reports the distribution of predicted and observed choices. The second panel displays
consideration probabilities and the distribution of optimal choices under full consideration.
The model’s ability to match data extends also to conditional moments. The first two panels
of Figure 2 show observed and predicted choices for the fraction of households facing low
and high premiums, respectively, and the next two panels are for households facing low and
high claim probabilities.46 Finally, the last two panels capture households who face both low
claim probabilities and high prices and vice versa. It is transparent from Figure 2 that the
model matches closely the observed frequency of choices across different subgroups of DMs
facing a variety of prices and claim probabilities, even though some of these frequencies are
quite different from the aggregate ones.
The ARC model’s ability to violate Generalized Dominance is key in matching the data. In
our dataset, the $200 collision deductible is always dominated either by the $100 deducible
or the $250 deductible. This happens because of the particular pricing schedule in collision.
It costs the same to get an additional $50 of coverage by lowering the deductible from $250
to $200 as it does to get an additional $100 of coverage by lowering the deductible from $200
to $100. If a household’s risk aversion is sufficiently small, then it prefers the $250 deducible
to the $200 deducible. If, on the other hand, the household’s level of risk aversion is such
that it would prefer the $200 deducible to the $250 deductible, then it would also prefer
getting twice the coverage for the same increase in the premium. That is, for any level of
risk aversion, the $200 deducible is dominated either by the $100 deducible or by the $250
deducible.47 Yet, overall the $200 deductible is chosen roughly as often as the $100 and $250
46Low/high groups here are defined as households whose claim rate (or baseline price) are in the bot-
tom/top third of the distribution.
47This pattern is at odds not only with EUT but also many non-EU models (Barseghyan et al., 2016).
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Figure 2: The ARC Model: Conditional Distributions
deductibles combined. More so, for certain sub-groups the $200 deductible is chosen much
more often than the $100 and $250 deducible combined.48 It follows that a model satisfying
Generalized Dominance cannot rationalize these choices.
In the next step of our estimation analysis we relax the assumption that demographic vari-
ables do not influence risk preferences. While it is ideal to control for households’ observable
characteristics non-parametrically, it is data demanding. In practice, it is commonly as-
sumed that household characteristics shift the expected value of the preference-coefficient
distribution.49 We adopt the same strategy here by assuming that for each household i,
log
β1,i
β2
= Ziγ, where γ is an unknown vector to be estimated. The terms β1,i and β2
denote the parameters of the Beta distribution, where β1,i is household specific and β2 is
common across households. The preference coefficients are random draws from a distribu-
tion with an expected value that is a function of the observable characteristics given by
E(νi) =
β1,i
β1,i+β2
ν¯ = e
Ziγ
1+eZiγ
ν¯.50 The results of this estimation are in line with our first estima-
tion. (See Column 2 in Table F.1, as well as Figures F.1 and F.2 in Appendix F.) The new
observation here is that the model closely matches the distribution of choices across vari-
ous sub-populations in the sample including gender, age, credit worthiness, and contracts
48For example, the fraction of households facing low p¯ and high µ that choose the $200 deductible is 0.26,
while the fraction that choose the $100 deductibles or the $250 deductibles is 0.18.
49For exmaple, Cohen & Einav (2007) assume that log νi = Ziγ + εi, where Zi are the observables for
household i and εi is i.i.d. N(0, σ
2). Hence, E(νi) = e
Ziγ+σ
2/2.
50If, instead, we assume log
β2,i
β1
= Ziγ˜, then we arrive to the same expression for the expected value with
the exception that γ˜ = −γ.
33
with multiple drivers. The model’s ability to match these conditional distributions can be
attributed, in part, to the dependence of risk preferences on household characteristics. The
model is, however, fairly parsimonious as the consideration parameters are restricted to be
the same across all households. Finally, estimated consideration probabilities are close in
magnitude to those estimated above. In particular, the highest deductibles ($1, 000 and
$500) are most likely to be considered, with respective frequencies of 0.95 and 0.91. The
remaining alternatives are considered at much lower frequencies.
7.3.2 The RCL Model and the RUM
For completeness, we now discuss estimation results for the RCL Model and the RUM
with unobserved heterogeneity. In both cases, we assume that risk-preference coefficient is
Beta distributed with support [0, ν¯], where, as before, ν¯ = 0.02. A priori, neither of these
models should do well in matching the distribution of observed choices. Both of them satisfy
the Conditional Rank Order Property and have no ability to direct households’ choices
in a particular direction. Instead, they smoothly spread households’ choices around their
respective first bests: the closer the expected utility of a given alternative is to the expected
utility of the first best, the higher the frequency at which it will be chosen.
Consequently, these models cannot match the observed distribution and, in particular, are
unable to explain the relatively high observed share of the $200 deductible. Table F.2 reports
the estimation results for the RCL model and the RUM. Figure F.3 compares the observed
distribution of choices and the predicted ones under both models. The predicted distributions
are similar to each other, but are a much poorer fit to the data than that of the ARC Model.
To formally assess how well these models fit the data relative to the ARC, we rely on the
Vuong test. The latter takes into account both the fact that the models are not nested and
that they can have different number of parameters. The test soundly (at 1% level) rejects
both the RCL and the RUM in favor of the ARC Model.
7.3.3 The ARC Model: All Coverages
We now proceed with estimation of the full model. We consider two cases. In the first
case households’ risk preferences are invariant across coverages, but consideration sets form
independently within each coverage. There are three sets of consideration parameters {ϕcoll,
ϕcomp, ϕhome} and the probability that alternative k is considered in one coverage (e.g.
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collision) is independent of the probability that alternative j is considered in another coverage
(comprehensive or home). Hence, within each coverage, the households’ problem is identical
to that from the previous section.51 The estimation results are presented in Figure F.4 and
Table F.3. Just as in the case of collision coverage only, the model matches well the choice
distributions within each coverage. However, the independence of consideration sets across
coverages implies that the model does not have the ability to match the joint distribution
of choices. For example, the model predicts zero rank correlation across the deductibles and
that 12% of households choose an alternative with a larger comprehensive deductible than
collision deductible. In the data the rank correlation ranges from 0.35 to 0.61 and only 0.2%
of households choose a larger comprehensive deductible.
We next assume that households’ consideration sets are formed over the entire deductible
portfolio. There are 120 possible alternative triplets (dcoll, dcomp, dhome), each having its
own probability of being considered. This model is flexible as it nests many rule of thumb
assumptions such as only considering contracts with the same deductible level across the three
contexts or only considering contracts with a larger collision deductible than comprehensive
deductible. Figure 3 and Table F.4 present estimation results. The first panel of the figure
shows the predicted distribution of choices across triplets, ranked in descending order by
observed frequencies. The second panel plots the differences between predicted and observed
choice distributions. Clearly, the predicted distribution is close to the observed distribution.
The largest difference between the predicted and observed distributions is equal to 0.96
percentage points, which occurs at the ($500, $500, $500) triplet that is chosen by 26% of
the households. The integrated absolute error across all triplets is 4.61%. We note that in
our data 43 out of 120 triplets are never chosen (these are omitted from Figure 3). It is
straightforward to show analytically that likelihood maximization implies that the consider-
ation probabilities for these triplets must be zero, so that their predicted shares are de facto
zero.52 Consequently, the likelihood maximization routine is faster and more reliable as we
do not need to search for ϕj for these alternatives.
Another virtue of the ARC Model is that it effortlessly reconciles two sides of the debate
51Effectively this scenario amounts to assuming “narrow bracketing” (Read, Loewenstein, & Rabin, 1999),
a common approach in the literature. Note that under full consideration there is no loss of generality in
assuming narrow bracketing. As it is well known, with CARA preferences the decision in one context is
independent of the decisions in other contexts as long as loss events are mutually exclusive.
52Since we are estimating the model with the Coin Toss completion rule, these options still can be chosen
if the consideration set is empty and ϕj < 1 for all j. In our estimation, the probability that the consideration
set is empty is 0.0015, which implies that an alternative with zero consideration probability is chosen with
probability 0.0015/120=0.000013.
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Figure 3: The ARC Model, Three Coverages
Triplets are sorted by observed frequency at which they are chosen. The first panel reports the predicted choice
frequency and the second panel reports the difference in predicted and observed choice frequencies.
on stability of risk preferences (Barseghyan, Prince, & Teitelbaum, 2011; Einav et al., 2012;
Barseghyan et al., 2016). On the one hand, households’ risk aversion relative to their peers
is correlated across contexts, implying that households preferences have a stable component.
On the other hand, analyses based on revealed preference reject the standard models of
risk aversion: under full consideration, for the vast majority of households one cannot find
a (household-specific) risk aversion parameter that can justify their choices simultaneously
across all contexts. Relaxing full consideration allows to match the observed joint distribution
of choices, and hence their rank correlations.
Estimated risk preferences are similar to those estimated with collision only data, although
the variance is slightly smaller. Turning to consideration, the triplet considered far more
frequently than any other alternative is the cheapest one: ($1, 000, $1, 000, $1, 000).53 Its
consideration probability is 0.81, while the next two most considered triplets are ($500,
$500, $1,000) and ($500, $500, $500). These are considered with probability 0.47 and 0.43,
respectively. Overall, there is a strong positive correlation (0.54) between the consideration
probability and sum of the deductibles in a given alternative. We summarize once more
the computational advantages of our procedure. First, estimation of our model remains
feasible for a large choice set, since our likelihood calculation does not require summation of
53The first entry is for collision, the second is for comprehensive, and the third is for home.
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probabilities over all possible consideration sets containing each household’s choice.54 Second,
the model’s parameters grow linearly with the choice set – one parameter per an additional
alternative – which keeps the computations in check. Third, enlarging the choice set does not
call for new independent sources of data variation. For example, in our model whether there
are five deductible alternatives or hundred twenty would not make any difference neither
from an identification nor an estimation stand point: with sufficient variation in p¯ and/or µ
the model is identified and can be estimated.
As a final remark, once the model is estimated, one can compute the monetary cost of limited
consideration. In our data, it is $49 (see Appendix D).
8 Beyond Expected Utility
Our framework can also be applied to non-EU models as long as risk attitudes are determined
by a unidimensional index. Consider, e.g., the probability distortions model in Barseghyan et
al. (2013).55 Under this model, the expected utility of a lottery is evaluated using a distorted
claim probability Ω(µ) instead of µ:
EU(Lj(x)) = (1− Ω(µ))u (w − pj) + Ω(µ)u (w − pj − dj) .
Let u(·) be linear across all DMs, and hence Ω(·) is the only source of risk aversion. Assume
that for a given µ, Ω(µ) is randomly distributed across DMs with support [Ω,Ω] ⊂ [0, 1]. Since
the SCP is trivially satisfied, identification of both the ARC and the RCL models follows
under the same conditions as in Section 4. If, however, u(·) is concave and varies across
DMs, then there are two distinct sources of aversion to risk, ν and Ω(µ). While parametric
identification of the joint distribution of {ν,Ω(·)} under full consideration is straightforward,
non-parametric identification is an open question (Barseghyan et al., 2018). If conditions can
be derived for non-parametric identification under full consideration, then our identification
strategy may be used to obtain identification under limited consideration as well.
54This is contrast to Goeree’s (2008) method, which utilizes the logit structure and hence must keep
track of all consideration sets containing the household’s choice. In our setting, it is feasible to estimate an
additive error RUM assuming the DMs consider each deductible triplet as a separate alternative (Figure F.5
and Table F.5). As the figure shows, the failure to match data is evident. The Vuong test formally rejects
it in favor of the ARC model.
55In the context of binary lotteries this model incorporates many leading alternatives to EUT. See
Barseghyan et al. (2018) for a discussion.
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9 Conclusion
In this paper we built a framework where DMs consider only a subset of the available al-
ternatives. We offered two models with different consideration formation mechanisms and
established their identification. There are many ways – such as liquidity constraints or ex-
tremeness aversion that we discussed – in which limited consideration may arise. While much
effort in applied theory has been towards constructing non-EU models that can generate
rankings of alternatives that are different from those in EUT, a promising and complemen-
tary avenue is to build and test theories that allow for limited consideration in the decision
making process. There are many open questions. First, what economic forces determine the
formation of consideration sets and how does consideration change with the market setting?
Second, once we allow for limited consideration, how do our conclusions about the underly-
ing models of risk change? Would we still need non-EU models to explain DMs’ behavior in
real market situations, as it is commonly argued in the literature, and if yes which ones?
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Appendices
A Identification Proofs
Lemma A.1. Consider the ARC Model under the Coin Toss completion rule. If there exists
characteristics xL and permutation {o1, . . . , oD} such that ∀ν ∈ [0, ν¯]
Lo1(x
L)  Lo2(xL)  · · ·  LoD(xL),
then the following relationship holds for all j = 1, . . . , D:
ϕoj =
qoj − r
1 + (j − 1)r −∑j−1k=1 qok ,
where qok ≡ Pr(d = dok |xL) and r = 1D
∏N
k=1(1− ϕok).
Proof. Without loss of generality suppose that k = ok for all k. Fix any j ∈ D. We first
show that
j−1∏
k=1
(1− ϕk) = 1 + (j − 1)r −
j−1∑
k=1
qk.
On the one hand, by additivity of probability and the definition of qk
Pr(d ∈ {d1, d2, ...dj−1}|xL) =
j−1∑
k=1
qk.
On the other hand, according to the model, it is the probability that at least one of
{d1, d2, ...dj−1} is considered plus the probability one of them is chosen when the consid-
eration set is empty:
Pr(d ∈ {d1, d2, ...dj−1}|xL) = 1−
j−1∏
k=1
(1− ϕk) + (j − 1)r.
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Finally, due to the assumption of the preference ordering,
qj = ϕj
j−1∏
k=1
(1− ϕk) + r
= ϕj
(
1 + (j − 1)r −
j−1∑
k=1
qk
)
+ r.
Lemma A.2. Consider the ARC Model under the Default Option completion rule. If there
exist characteristics xL and permutation {o1, . . . , oD} such that ∀ν ∈ [0, ν¯]
Lo1(x
L)  Lo2(xL)  · · ·  LoD(xL),
then the following relationship holds for all j = 1, . . . , D:
ϕoj =

qoj−r
1−∑j−1k=1 qok if doj is the default option
qoj
1+r−∑j−1k=1 qok if don is the default option for some n < j
qoj
1−∑j−1k=1 qok otherwise
,
where qok ≡ Pr(d = dok |xL) and r =
∏N
k=1(1− ϕok).
Proof. Let dn denote the default option. The proof follows exactly the same steps as the
proof of the previous lemma, except with the following two changes:
Pr(d ∈ {d1, d2, ...dj−1}|xL) =
1−
∏j−1
k=1(1− ϕk) + r if n < j
1−∏j−1k=1(1− ϕk) otherwise.
qj =
ϕj
∏j−1
k=1(1− ϕk) + r if n = j
ϕj
∏j−1
k=1(1− ϕk) otherwise.
The three cases immediately follow depending on whether n < j, n = j, or n > j.
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Lemma A.3. Consider the ARC Model under the Outside Option completion rule. If there
exist characteristics xL and permutation {o1, . . . , oD} such that ∀ν ∈ [0, ν¯]
Lo1(x
L)  Lo2(xL)  · · ·  LoD(xL),
then the following relationship holds for all j = 1, . . . , D:
ϕoj =
(1− r)qoj
1− (1− r)∑j−1k=1 qok ,
where qok ≡ Pr(d = dok |xL,K 6= ∅), K is the consideration set, and r =
∏N
k=1(1− ϕok).
Proof. Without loss of generality suppose that k = ok for all k. Fix any j ∈ D. We first
show that
j−1∏
k=1
(1− ϕk) = 1− (1− r)
j−1∑
k=1
qk.
On the one hand, by additivity of probability and the definition of qk
Pr(d ∈ {d1, d2, ...dj−1}|xL) = Pr(K 6= ∅)Pr(d ∈ {d1, d2, ...dj−1}|xL,K 6= ∅) = (1− r)
j−1∑
k=1
qk.
On the other hand, according to the model, it is the probability that at least one of
{d1, d2, ...dj−1} is considered
Pr(d ∈ {d1, d2, ...dj−1}|xL) = 1−
j−1∏
k=1
(1− ϕk).
Finally, due to the assumption of the preference ordering,
qj =
1
(1− r)ϕj
j−1∏
k=1
(1− ϕk)
=
1
(1− r)ϕj
(
1− (1− r)
j−1∑
k=1
qk
)
.
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Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Start with Coin Toss. Let dom be the first alternative in the sequence Lo1(x
1) 
Lo2(x
1)  . . . such that om 6= m. Let j be the position of alternative om in the sequence
L1(x
0)  L2(x0)  . . . . Note that m < j, dom = dj, and all lotteries that dominate dom at
x1 also dominate dj at x
0, since, by construction o1 = 1, o2 = 2, o3 = 3, . . . , om−1 = m− 1.
The assumptions are satisfied in Lemma A.1 for dj at x
0 and dom at x
1. It follows that:
qj − r
1 + (j − 1)r −∑j−1k=1 qk = ϕj = ϕom = som − r1 + (m− 1)r −∑m−1k=1 sok . (A.1)
where qk ≡ Pr(d = dk|x0) and sok ≡ Pr(d = dok |x1). This is a quadratic equation in r. Note
that
som = ϕom
m−1∏
k=1
(1− ϕok) + r ≥ r.
So any admissible solution for r ought to be in the interval [0, som ]; we show that Equation
(A.1) has a unique solution in [0, som ].
Collecting terms we can write Equation (A.1) as follows:
g(r) ≡ ar2 + br + c
≡ (m− j)r2 +
(
som(j − 1)− qj(m− 1) +
j−1∑
k=1
qk −
m−1∑
k=1
sok
)
r + som
(
1−
j−1∑
k=1
qk
)
− qj
(
1−
m−1∑
k=1
sok
)
= 0.
We first show the following
1. qj < som
2.
∑j−1
k=1 qk >
∑m−1
k=1 sok
3. som
(
1−∑j−1k=1 qk) < qj (1−∑m−1k=1 sok)
from which it follows that the coefficients for the quadratic function satisfy a < 0, b > 0,
and c < 0.
Indeed, we have:
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1. qj < som :
qj = ϕj
j−1∏
k=1
(1− ϕk) + r
= ϕom
m−1∏
k=1
(1− ϕok)
j−1∏
k=m
(1− ϕk) + r (since o1 = 1, . . . , om−1 = m− 1).
< ϕom
m−1∏
k=1
(1− ϕok) + r
= som .
2.
∑j−1
k=1 qk >
∑m−1
k=1 sok :
j−1∑
k=1
qk =
m−1∑
k=1
sok +
j−1∑
k=m
qk >
m−1∑
k=1
sok .
3. som
(
1−∑j−1k=1 qk) < qj (1−∑m−1k=1 sok):(
1−
j−1∑
k=1
qk
)
=
j−1∏
k=1
(1− ϕk)− (j − 1)r
=
m−1∏
k=1
(1− ϕok)
j−1∏
k=m
(1− ϕk)− (j − 1)r
≡ uv − (j − 1)r,(
1−
j−1∑
k=1
sok
)
=
m−1∏
k=1
(1− ϕok)− (m− 1)r = u− (m− 1)r,
som = ϕom
m−1∏
k=1
(1− ϕok) + r = ϕju+ r, and
qj = ϕj
j−1∏
k=1
(1− ϕk) + r = ϕjuv + r.
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Putting this together we have:
som
(
1−
j−1∑
k=1
qk
)
− qj
(
1−
m−1∑
k=1
sok
)
= (ϕju+ r)(uv − (j − 1)r)− (ϕjuv + r)(u− (m− 1)r)
= (m− j)r2 + ϕjur(v(m− 1)− (j − 1)) + ur(v − 1)
< 0
since u, v, r, ϕj ∈ [0, 1] and m < j.
We have shown that the coefficients of the quadratic function g(r) have the following signs
a =m− j < 0
b =
(
som(j − 1)− qj(m− 1) +
j−1∑
k=1
qk −
m−1∑
k=1
sok
)
> 0
c =som
(
1−
j−1∑
k=1
qk
)
− qj
(
1−
m−1∑
k=1
sok
)
< 0.
Thus g(r) is a concave quadratic function. To understand its behavior we show that g(r)
evaluated at r = som is positive.
g(som) = (m− j)s2om +
(
som(j − 1)− qj(m− 1) +
j−1∑
k=1
qk −
m−1∑
k=1
sok
)
som + som
(
1−
j−1∑
k=1
qk
)
− qj
(
1−
m−1∑
k=1
sok
)
= (m− 1)s2om +
(
1− qj(m− 1)−
m−1∑
k=1
sok
)
som − qj
(
1−
m−1∑
k=1
sok
)
= (m− 1)som(som − qj) + (som − qj)
(
1−
m−1∑
k=1
sok
)
= (som − qj)
(
msom + 1−
m∑
k=1
sok
)
> 0,
since som > qj and
∑m
k=1 sok ∈ [0, 1]. It follows that one root of g(r) is always contained
in the interval (−∞, som), say r−, and the other root is always contained in the interval
(som ,∞), say r+.
Now since c is negative both roots are positive so that the unique solution to g(r) = 0 on
[0, som ] is r
− and hence r is identified. Once r is known, all ϕj’s are derived according to the
expression in Lemma A.1 applied to d1, · · · , dD at x0.
We now turn to Default Option. Assume W.L.O.G that all ϕj’s are positive. Indeed, ϕj = 0
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iff alternative j is never chosen for any x and hence is identified. As above, let dom be the first
alternative in the sequence Lo1(x
1)  Lo2(x1)  . . . such that om 6= m. Let j be the position
of alternative om in the sequence L1(x
0)  L2(x0)  . . . . Note that m < j, dom = dj,
and all lotteries that dominate dom at x
1 also dominate dj at x
0, since, by construction
o1 = 1, o2 = 2, o3 = 3, . . . , om−1 = m− 1.
The assumptions are satisfied in Lemma A.3 for dj at x
0 and dom at x
1. It follows that:
(1− r)qj
1 + (1− r)∑j−1k=1 qk = ϕj = ϕom = (1− r)som1 + (1− r)∑m−1k=1 sok . (A.2)
where qk ≡ Pr(d = dk|x0, d ∈ {d1, d2, ..., dD}) and sok ≡ Pr(d = dok |x1, d ∈ {d1, d2, ..., dD}).
If ϕj = 0, it is immediate that r = 0. On the other hand, if ϕj > 0, then Equation A.2
implies that
r = 1− som
∑j−1
k=1 qk − qj
∑m−1
k=1 sok
som − qj
.
Since qj < som and
∑j−1
k=1 qk >
∑m−1
k=1 sok , there is a unique r ∈ [0, 1] that solves the Equation
A.2. With known r, we can learn ϕj’s sequentially according to Lemma A.3: ϕ1 = (1− r)q1,
ϕ2 =
(1−r)q2
1−(1−r)q1 , and so on.
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Let dn denote the default alternative so that it is n
th best at x0. Let r =
∏D
k=1(1−ϕk).
We first show that r is identified.
Let dj and (W.L.O.G) let j > n, so that dn  dj by all DMs with characteristics x0
regardless of their ν. Let oj′ and on′ index the position of dj and dn at x
1. That is, dj = doj′
and dj = don′ . By assumption we have j
′ < n′ so that dj is preferred to dn by any DM with
characteristics x1. The conditions for Lemma A.2 hold, so that
qj
r + 1−∑n−1k=1 qk = ϕj = ϕoj′ =
soj′
1−∑n′−1k=1 sok ,
Solving for r yields:
r =
qj
(
1−∑n′−1k=1 sok)− soj′ (1−∑n−1k=1 qk)
soj′
.
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Note that, by assumption, qj, soj′ > 0 so r is well defined. Once r is known, all ϕj’s are
derived according to the expression in Lemma A.2 applied to d1, . . . , dD at x
0.
Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Let qj = Pr(dj|x0) and sok = Pr(dok |x1). We can learn n and ϕj for all j ≤ n
as follows. By assumption, there are no preferred options among alternatives d1, . . . , dn−1.
Hence,
1. ϕ1 = q1. If ϕ1 = 1 then n = 1. Otherwise, set j = 2 and proceed to Step 2.
2. ϕj =
qj
1−∑j−1k=1 qk . If ϕj = 1 then n = j. Otherwise, set j = j + 1 and repeat Step 2.
Repeating this argument for the moments evaluated at x1, we find the first n∗ such that
ϕon∗ = 1 (i.e. n
∗ = minn′∈{n′,...,n′} n′ where on′ = n, . . . , on′ = n) and ϕoj′ for all j
′ ≤ n∗.
To summarize we have identified ϕj for all j ≤ n and all j ≥ n (since whenever j ≥ n it also
the case that j′ ≤ n∗ where oj′ = j). By assumption, Preferred Options are adjacent so that
whenever n ≤ n ≤ n, dn is also Preferred Options and hence ϕn = 1.
Proof of Theorem 7
Proof. We have that
Pr(d = dD|x1) = φ1Q1,D
Pr(d = dD−1|x1) = φ1Q1,D−1 + φ2Q2,D−1
...
Pr(d = d1|x1) = φ1Q1,1 + φ2Q2,1 + ...+ φDQD,1
The Q’s in the equations above are known and are strictly positive. It follows that φ’s are
identified sequentially.
Proof of Theorem 8
Proof. We start with Assumption 2.A1-A3. Denote A = {k : ϕk > 0} under the ARC
Model and A = D under the RCL Model. Fix j corresponding to Assumption 2.A1-A3 and
denote j(j, t) ≡ arg mink∈A−{j} cj,k(x(t)). By Assumption 2.A3 and the continuity of c(·),
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the alternative corresponding to j(j, t) is the same for all t ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, we can write
WLOG j = j(j, t). For any t ∈ [0, 1] we have
Pr(d = dj|x(t)) = wj,jF (cj(x(t))) +
∑
k∈A−{j,j}
wj,kF (cj,k(x(t))) + rˆj,
where rˆj ≥ 0, wj,j > 0 and all wj,k > 0 are known functions of the limited consideration
parameters. Since the latter are identified, so are rˆj, wj,j and wj,k, k 6= j, j. Next, find the
smallest t1 such that cj,k(x(t1)) ≥ ν¯ for all k ∈ A− {j, j}. In other words, t1 is the smallest
value of t for which only the lowest cutoff is below the upper bound of the support. It follows
that for any t ∈ [t1, 1],
Pr(d = dj|x(t)) = wj,jF (cj(x(t))) + rˆj,
which implies that F (·) is identified for all ν ∈ [ν1, ν¯] where ν1 ≡ cj(x(t1)). It is clear that if
A− {j, j} = ∅ we are done. Otherwise, find the smallest t2 such that cj,k(x(t2)) ≥ ν1 for all
k ∈ A−{j, j}. In other words, t2 is the smallest value of t for which only the lowest cutoff is
below ν1. Since all other cutoffs lie in the region where F (·) is known, it follows that F (·) is
identified for all ν ∈ [ν2, ν1], and, hence for all ν ∈ [ν2, ν¯], where ν2 ≡ cj(x(t2)). Proceeding in
this way we have that F (·) is identified over [νn, ν¯]. {νn} is a strictly monotonically declining
sequence defined recursively as
νn ≡ cj(x(tn))
t0 = 1
tn = min
t∈[0,1]
t
s.t. cj,k(x(t)) ≥ νn−1 ∀k ∈ A− {j, j}.
This sequence either eventually converges to 0, crosses to the left of 0, or converges to some
accumulation point ν∗ in the interior of [0, ν¯]. In the former cases we have identification.
We claim that the latter case cannot arise. For the purpose of obtaining a contradiction,
suppose that ν∗ = limn→∞ νn > 0. By continuity it follows that
lim
n→∞
cj(x(tn)) = cj(x(t
∗)),
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where
t∗ ≡ lim
n→∞
tn
= lim
n→∞
(
min
t∈[0,1]
t s.t. cj,k(x(t)) ≥ νn−1 ∀k ∈ A− {j, j}
)
= min
t∈[0,1]
t s.t. cj,k(x(t)) ≥ lim
n→∞
νn−1 ∀k ∈ A− {j, j} (by continuity)
= min
t∈[0,1]
t s.t. cj,k(x(t)) ≥ ν∗ ∀k ∈ A− {j, j}.
Now since the cutoffs are strictly decreasing in t, there is a k ∈ A − {j, j} such that
cj,k(x(t
∗)) = ν∗. Putting this together we yield
cj,k(x(t
∗)) = ν∗ = cj(x(t
∗)),
which contradicts Assumption 2.A3.
Under Assumption 2.B1-3 the proof works in the exactly same way, only we start at the
lower end of the preference-coefficient support.
B Proofs of Properties
Proof of Fact 1
Proof. Take any non empty consideration set K. For a given preference coefficient ν, let
jK(ν) denote the identity of the best alternative in this consideration set. Because of the
way alternatives are ordered, jK(ν) is an increasing step function. Hence, I(jK(ν) ≤ J) is a
decreasing step function, Note, that Pr
(⋃J
j=1 dj
∣∣∣∣x, ν) is the sum of I(jK(ν) ≤ J) weighted
by the probability of K being drawn. Hence it is decreasing in ν.
Proof of Fact 5
Proof. Suppose Uν(dj, x) > Uν(dk, x), but ϕk = 1 and ϕj = 0.
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Proof of Fact 6
Proof. Suppose Uν(dj, x) > Uν(dk, x). If both dj and dk are in the consideration set, then dj
will be chosen. For any consideration set that contains dk but not dj, there is an equal size
consideration set that contains dj but not dk, namely (K∪ dj) \ dk. These two sets have the
same probability of being formed. If dk is preferred to all other alternatives in K, then the
same is true for dj in K∪dj \dk. Summing over all consideration sets delivers the result.
C Verifying Identification in Our Application
We start by recalling that CARA and CRRA utility functions satisfy the following basic
property (see, e.g., Pratt, 1964; Barseghyan et al., 2018):56
Property C.1. For any y0 > y1 > y2 > 0, the ratio R(y0, y1, y2) ≡ uν(y1)−uν(y2)uν(y0)−uν(y1) is strictly
increasing in ν.
It follows that CARA and CRRA utility functions also satisfy a slightly extended version of
the property above:
Property C.2. For any y0 > y1 > y2 > y3 > 0, the ratio Qν(y0, y1, y2, y3) ≡ uν(y2)−uν(y3)uν(y0)−uν(y1) is
strictly increasing in ν.
Proof.
Qν(y0, y1, y2, y3) =
uν(y2)− uν(y3)
uν(y0)− uν(y1) =
uν(y2)− uν(y3)
uν(y1)− uν(y2) ×
uν(y1)− uν(y2)
uν(y0)− uν(y1)
= Rν(y1, y2, y3)Rν(y0, y1, y2)
For our application, we show that c1,2(p¯, µ) < c1,m(p¯, µ) for any m > 2 under both CARA
and CRRA preferences.
Theorem C.1. Under either CARA or CRRA expected utility preferences, the cutoff map-
pings satisfy c1,2(p¯, µ) < c1,m(p¯, µ) for any m > 2.
56This property is equivalent to condition (e) in Pratt (1964, Theorem 1). As shown there, it is equivalent
to assuming that an increase in ν corresponds to an increase in the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
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Proof. We start with CARA preferences. The existence and the uniqueness of cj,k(x) for all
j < k follows directly from the Property C.2. Indeed note that pj < pk < pk +dk < pj +dj.
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At the cutoff the DM is indifferent between lotteries j and k. Equating two expected utilities
and rearranging we have that
e−ν(w−pk−dk) − e−ν(w−pj−dj)
e−ν(w−pj) − e−ν(w−pk) =
1− µ
µ
, (C.1)
where w is the DM’s initial wealth. By Property C.2, the L.H.S. of Equation C.1 is strictly
monotone in ν, and it tends to +∞ when ν goes to +∞ and to zero when ν goes to −∞.
It follows that there exists a unique ν, i.e the cutoff cj,k(x), that solves the Equation C.1.
Moreover, since the L.H.S. is strictly monotone in ν it follows from the Implicit Function
Theorem that cj,k(x) is continuous in µ and p¯.
The next step is to establish that c1,2(p¯, µ) < c1,m(p¯, µ), m > 2. First, note that the expected
utility of lottery k is proportional to
EUν(Lk) ∝ −eνpk
(
1− µ+ µeνdk)
For the purpose of obtaining a contradiction, suppose that there exists (p¯, µ) and an m such
that c1,2(p¯, µ) = c1,m(p¯, µ). That is, there exists a ν = c1,2(p¯, µ) = c1,m(p¯, µ) such that
1− µ+ µeνd1
1− µ+ µeνd2 e
ν(g1−g2)p¯ = 1 =
1− µ+ µeνd1
1− µ+ µeνdm e
ν(g1−gm)p¯
Taking logs for each side and rearranging we have that
log
(
1− µ+ µeνd1
1− µ+ µeνd2
)
= −ν(g1 − g2)p¯
log
(
1− µ+ µeνd1
1− µ+ µeνdm
)
= −ν(g1 − gm)p¯.
Dividing through we have that
log
(
1−µ+µeνd1
1−µ+µeνd2
)
log
(
1−µ+µeνd1
1−µ+µeνdm
) = g1 − g2
g1 − gm .
57If pk + dk > pj + dj , then alterantive j first order stochastically dominates k and hence the cuttoff is
+∞.
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The R.H.S. is less than one. The L.H.S. is monotonically decreasing in µ < 1. Indeed, denote
µˆ = 1−µ
µ
, ∆1 = e
νd1 , ∆2 = e
νd2 , and ∆m = e
νdm to rewrite the L.H.S. as follows
f(µˆ) ≡ log(∆1 + µˆ)− log(∆2 + µˆ)
log(∆1 + µˆ)− log(∆m + µˆ) .
We claim that the expression above is monotonically increasing in µˆ. Its derivative is equal
to
f ′(µˆ)
f(µˆ)
=
(
1
∆1 + µˆ
− 1
∆2 + µˆ
)
1
log(∆1 + µˆ)− log(∆2 + µˆ) −
(
1
∆1 + µˆ
− 1
∆m + µˆ
)
1
log(∆1 + µˆ)− log(∆m + µˆ)
Once more relabeling Λ1 = − log(∆1 + µˆ), Λ2 = − log(∆2 + µˆ) and Λm = − log(∆m + µˆ) we
can write the above as
f ′(µˆ)
f(µˆ)
=
eΛ1 − eΛm
Λ1 − Λm −
eΛ1 − eΛ2
Λ1 − Λ2 .
Since Λ1 < Λ2 < Λm and exponential function is convex, we have that the expression above
is positive. Hence the derivative of f
(
1−µ
µ
)
W.R.T. µ is negative, and hence it achieves its
lowest value at µ = 1. When µ = 1, the L.H.S. is equal to d1−d2
d1−dm . Hence, the question is
whether the following equality may hold
d1 − d2
d1 − dm =
g1 − g2
g1 − gm .
It naturally would hold in perfectly competitive markets where additional coverage is simply
proportional to its price. In practice, however, one might expect that with some market
power the prices increase faster than then coverage, which is exactly what we find in our
data (as well as for a larger number of firms appearing in Barseghyan et al. (2011)). Hence
c1,2(p¯, µ) 6= c1,m(p¯, µ), for m > 2. Since the cutoffs are continuous, it follows that c1,2(p¯, µ) <
c1,m(p¯, µ) for m > 2.
Under CRRA, cj,k(p¯, µ) exist and are continuous exactly for the same reasons as under
CARA. It remains to establish that c1,2(p¯, µ) < c1,m(p¯, µ) for m > 2. Consider the following
Taylor expansion for the CRRA Bernoulli utility function u(w) about point w − pk:
uν(w) ≡ w
1−ν
1− ν
=
(w − pk)1−ν
1− ν +
w−ν
1!
pk − νw
−ν−1
2!
p2k + ν(ν + 1)
w−ν−2
3!
p3k − ν(ν + 1)(ν + 2)
w−ν−1
4!
p4k + . . .
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This can be written as follows
(w − pk)1−ν − w1−ν
w1−ν
= −1− ν
w
pk +
(1− ν)(−ν)
2!w2
p2k −
(1− ν)(−ν)(−ν − 1)
3!w3
p3k + ...
Hence, we can write
EUν(Lk) ∝ (1− µ)
∞∑
t=1
ωtp
t
k + µ
∞∑
t=1
ωt (pk + dk)
t .
The coefficients ωt ≡ (t!wt)−1
∏t−1
t′=0(1− ν − t′)(−1)t are negative for all t, so the two power
series above are absolutely convergent. Hence, we take the element-wise difference between
EUν(Lj) and EUν(Lk):
EUν(Lj)− EUν(Lk) ∝ (1− µ)
∞∑
t=1
ωt
(
ptj − ptk
)
+ µ
∞∑
t=1
ωt
(
(pj + dj)
t − (pk + dk)t
)
= (pj − pk) (1− µ)
∞∑
t=1
ωt
t∑
h=0
phj p
t−h
k +
+ ((pj − pk) + (dj − dk))µ
∞∑
t=1
ωt
t∑
h=0
(pj + dj)
h (pk + dk)
t−h
This implies that if ν = c1,2(p¯, µ) = c1,m(p¯, µ), m > 2 we must have that
p1 − p2
p1 − pm =
p1 − p2 + d1 − d2
p1 − pm + d1 − dm×∑∞
t=1 ωt
∑t
h=0 (p1 + d1)
h (p2 + d2)
t−h∑∞
t=1 ωt
∑t
h=0 (p1 + d1)
h (pm + dm)
t−h
∑∞
t=1 ωt
∑t
h=0 p
h
1p
t−h
m∑∞
t=1 ωt
∑t
h=0 p
h
1p
t−h
2
Note that pm > p2. More over, when ν = c1,2(p¯, µ) = c1,m(p¯, µ) it is also the case that
ν = c1,2(p¯, µ) = c1,m(p¯, µ) = c2,m(p¯, µ).
For the cutoff c2,m(p¯, µ) to be on the support it must be the case that p2 + d2 > pm + dm.
Indeed otherwise we have that pm − p2 > d2 − dm, which is a violation of the first order
stochastic dominance. Hence if we can show that
p1 − p2
p1 − pm <
p1 − p2 + d1 − d2
p1 − pm + d1 − dm ,
we would arrive to a contradiction, since it would be mean that the LHS of the equation is
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smaller than the RHS. Re-arranging we have that
p1 − pm + d1 − dm
p1 − pm <
p1 − p2 + d1 − d2
p1 − p2
d1 − dm
p1 − pm <
d1 − d2
p1 − p2
p1 − p2
p1 − pm <
d1 − d2
d1 − dm .
The latter inequality holds in the data, as discussed in the case of CARA.
D Monetary Cost of Limited Consideration
We view limited consideration as a process that constrains households from achieving their
first-best alternative either because the market setting forces some alternatives to become
more salient than others (e.g. agent effects) or because of time or psychological costs that
prevent the household from evaluating all alternatives in the choice set. Regardless of the
underlying mechanism(s) of limited consideration, we can quantify its monetary cost within
our framework. We ask, ceteris paribus, how much money the households “leave on the
table” when choosing deductibles in property insurance under limited consideration rather
than under full consideration. This is likely to be a lower bound on actual monetary losses
arising from limited consideration, because insurance companies might be exploiting sub-
optimality of households choices when setting prices or choosing menus.
We measure the monetary costs of limited consideration as follows. For each household we
compute (the expected value of) the certainty equivalent of the lottery associated with the
households’ optimal choice, as well as of the one associated with their choice under limited
consideration.58 We then take the difference between these certainty equivalent values and
average them across all households in the sample. On average, we find that households lose
$49 dollars across the three deductibles because of limited consideration. See Table F.7 for
variation conditional on demographic characteristics and insurance score. We also find wide
dispersion in loss across households (see Figure F.7). In particular, the 10th percentile of
losses is $30 and the 90th is $72.
58Certainty equivalent of the lottery is defined as the minimum amount they are willing to accept in lieu
of the lottery. In our case, for alternative j, it is simply cej ≡ 1ν ln[(1− µ) exp(νpj) + µ exp(ν(pj + dj))].
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E Data
Table E.1 Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 1st % 99th %
Age 53.3 15.7 25.4 84.3
Female 0.40
Single 0.22
Married 0.55
Second Driver 0.43
Insurance Score 767 112 532 985
Table E.2 Frequency of Deductible Choices Across Contexts
Deductible 1000 500 250 200 100 50
Collision 0.064 0.676 0.122 0.129 0.009
Comprehensive 0.037 0.430 0.121 0.329 0.039 0.044
Home 0.176 0.559 0.262 0.002
Table E.3 Deductible Rank Correlations Across
Contexts
Collision Comprehensive Home
Collision 1
Comprehensive 0.61 1
Home 0.37 0.35 1
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Table E.4 Joint Distribution of Auto Deductibles
Comprehensive
Collision 1000 500 250 200 100 50
1000 3.71 1.93 0.18 0.44 0.05 0.04
500 0 40.99 6.46 17.84 1.27 1.00
250 0 0.04 5.42 4.55 1.28 0.94
200 0.01 0.05 0.03 9.99 1.07 1.78
100 0 0 0 0.04 0.23 0.66
The distribution is reported in percent.
Table E.5 Average Premiums Across Coverages
Deductible 1,000 500 250 200 100 50
Collision 145 187 243 285 321
Comprehensive 94 117 147 155 178 224
Home 594 666 720 885
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F Empirical Results: Figures and Tables
F.1 Figures
Figure F.1: The ARC Model with Observable Demographics
The first panel reports the distribution of predicted and observed choices. The second panel displays
consideration probabilities and the distribution of optimal choices under full consideration.
Figure F.2: The ARC Model with Observable Demographics: Conditional Distributions
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Figure F.3: The RCL Model and the RUM
Figure F.4: The ARC Model, Three Coverages, “Narrow” Consideration
Figure F.5: The RUM, Three Coverages
Triplets are sorted by observed frequency at which they are chosen. The first panel reports the predicted choice
frequency and the second panel reports the difference in predicted and observed choice frequencies.
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Figure F.6: The ARC Model, Three Coverages:
Consideration and Optimal Choice Distribution
Triplets are sorted by observed frequency at which they are chosen.
Figure F.7: The ARC Model with Three Coverages:
Monetary Loss From Limited Consideration
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F.2 Tables
Table F.1 MLE Estimation Results for the ARC Model
ARC Model ARC Model with Observables
β1 1.621 [1.378, 1.948] 2.090 [1.556, 2.816]
β2 7.319 [5.946, 9.177] 8.855 [6.934, 11.758]
Mean of ν 0.004 [0.003, 0.004] 0.004 [0.003, 0.004]
SD of ν 0.002 [0.002, 0.003] 0.002 [0.002, 0.002]
Intercept - - −1.432 [-1.600, -1.302]
Age - - 0.211 [0.149, 0.298]
Age2 - - 0.047 [-0.002, 0.106]
Female Driver - - 0.075 [0.019, 0.145]
Single Driver - - 0.050 [-0.011, 0.114]
Married Driver - - 0.102 [0.022, 0.196]
Credit Score - - 0.137 [0.078, 0.199]
2+ Drivers - - −0.310 [-0.479, -0.155]
Collision $100 0.059 [0.041, 0.081] 0.051 [0.033, 0.071]
Collision $200 0.414 [0.371, 0.465] 0.392 [0.344, 0.453]
Collision $250 0.207 [0.190, 0.224] 0.205 [0.188, 0.227]
Collision $500 0.918 [0.904, 0.931] 0.915 [0.896, 0.927]
Collision $1000 1.000 [0.972, 1.000] 0.949 [0.690, 1.000]
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table F.2 MLE Estimation Results for the RCL and RUM Models
RCL Model RUM Model
β1 6.330 [5.085, 8.993] 8.401 [6.794, 10.650]
β2 100.232 [80.526, 142.598] 122.603 [102.578, 152.511]
Mean of ν 0.001 [0.001, 0.001] 0.001 [0.001, 0.001]
SD of ν 0.0005 [0.0004, 0.0005] 0.0004 [0.0004, 0.0005]
Intercept −2.569 [-2.656, -2.479] −2.647 [-2.713, -2.586]
Age −0.142 [-0.198, -0.090] −0.146 [-0.178, -0.118]
Age2 −0.047 [-0.098, 0.003] −0.026 [-0.051, -0.002]
Female Driver 0.011 [-0.039, 0.064] −0.004 [-0.032, 0.025]
Single Driver 0.038 [-0.014, 0.092] −0.010 [-0.039, 0.020]
Married Driver 0.027 [-0.044, 0.101] −0.031 [-0.069, 0.009]
Credit Score 0.232 [0.180, 0.288] 0.096 [0.073, 0.124]
2+ Drivers −0.390 [-0.535, -0.233] −0.021 [-0.101, 0.061]
Attention Level 1 0.031 [0.019, 0.046] - -
Attention Level 2 0.509 [0.447, 0.536] - -
Attention Level 3 0.000 [0.000, 0.086] - -
Attention Level 4 0.000 [0.000, 0.000] - -
Full Attention 0.460 [0.423, 0.484] - -
Sigma - - 0.040 [0.036, 0.043]
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table F.3 MLE Estimation Results for the ARC
Model, Three Coverages: “Narrow” Consideration
ARC Model
β1 1.152 [1.010, 1.284]
β2 3.141 [2.639, 3.694]
Mean of ν 0.005 [0.005, 0.006]
SD of ν 0.004 [0.004, 0.004]
Intercept −1.127 [-1.225, -1.032]
Age 0.198 [0.164, 0.235]
Age2 0.090 [0.059, 0.121]
Female Driver 0.052 [0.018, 0.088]
Single Driver 0.004 [-0.037, 0.047]
Married Driver 0.008 [-0.038, 0.062]
Credit Score 0.110 [0.077, 0.145]
2+ Drivers −0.089 [-0.186, 0.004]
Collision $100 0.033 [0.023, 0.043]
Collision $200 0.324 [0.299, 0.351]
Collision $250 0.199 [0.185, 0.216]
Collision $500 0.953 [0.945, 0.960]
Collision $1000 1.000 [0.870, 1.000]
Comprehensive $50 1.000 [1.000, 1.000]
Comprehensive $100 0.337 [0.291, 0.384]
Comprehensive $200 0.765 [0.744, 0.790]
Comprehensive $250 0.325 [0.295, 0.357]
Comprehensive $500 0.892 [0.853, 0.928]
Comprehensive $1000 0.277 [0.226, 0.316]
Home $100 0.002 [0.000, 0.010]
Home $250 0.387 [0.368, 0.409]
Home $500 0.859 [0.844, 0.877]
Home $1000 0.824 [0.774, 0.873]
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table F.4 MLE Estimation Results for the ARC Model, Three Coverages
ARC Model
β1 4.515 [3.432, 6.255]
β2 23.623 [17.528, 33.251]
Mean of ν 0.003 [0.003, 0.003]
SD of ν 0.001 [0.001, 0.002]
Intercept −1.706 [-1.792, -1.623]
Age 0.166 [0.130, 0.207]
Age2 0.041 [0.011, 0.073]
Female Driver 0.043 [0.006, 0.079]
Single Driver 0.011 [-0.028, 0.052]
Married Driver 0.031 [-0.020, 0.085]
Credit Score 0.141 [0.108, 0.175]
2+ Drivers −0.099 [-0.196, -0.0004]
(100,50,250) 0.041 [0.026, 0.059]
(100,50,500) 0.015 [0.005, 0.029]
(100,50,1000) 0.013 [0.000, 0.043]
(100,100,100) 0.002 [0.000, 0.010]
(100,100,250) 0.008 [0.002, 0.014]
(100,100,500) 0.005 [0.000, 0.011]
(100,100,1000) 0.005 [0.000, 0.019]
(100,200,250) 0.0006 [0.000, 0.003]
(100,200,500) 0.0008 [0.000, 0.003]
(100,200,1000) 0.004 [0.000, 0.016]
(200,50,100) 0.011 [0.000, 0.025]
(200,50,250) 0.065 [0.047, 0.088]
(200,50,500) 0.060 [0.039, 0.082]
(200,50,1000) 0.034 [0.007, 0.073]
(200,100,100) 0.002 [0.000, 0.009]
(200,100,250) 0.021 [0.013, 0.030]
(200,100,500) 0.028 [0.018, 0.039]
(200,100,1000) 0.023 [0.005, 0.048]
(200,200,100) 0.002 [0.000, 0.007]
(200,200,250) 0.155 [0.133, 0.178]
(200,200,500) 0.163 [0.140, 0.189]
(200,200,1000) 0.135 [0.090, 0.188]
(200,250,250) 0.0004 [0.000, 0.001]
(200,250,500) 0.0005 [0.000, 0.002]
(200,500,250) 0.002 [0.000, 0.004]
(200,1000,1000) 0.005 [0.000, 0.024]
(250,50,100) 0.002 [0.000, 0.009]
(250,50,250) 0.020 [0.013, 0.030]
(250,50,500) 0.033 [0.021, 0.047]
(250,100,250) 0.017 [0.012, 0.023]
(250,100,500) 0.016 [0.010, 0.023]
(250,100,1000) 0.019 [0.004, 0.037]
(250,200,100) 0.001 [0.000, 0.005]
ARC Model (cont.)
(250,200,250) 0.037 [0.029, 0.045]
(250,200,500) 0.056 [0.046, 0.067]
(250,200,1000) 0.045 [0.025, 0.067]
(250,250,100) 0.001 [0.000, 0.005]
(250,250,250) 0.042 [0.035, 0.050]
(250,250,500) 0.061 [0.051, 0.070]
(250,250,1000) 0.026 [0.011, 0.044]
(250,500,500) 0.0007 [0.000, 0.002]
(500,50,250) 0.034 [0.020, 0.049]
(500,50,500) 0.053 [0.032, 0.077]
(500,50,1000) 0.034 [0.007, 0.074]
(500,100,250) 0.015 [0.009, 0.022]
(500,100,500) 0.042 [0.029, 0.059]
(500,100,1000) 0.049 [0.022, 0.081]
(500,200,100) 0.008 [0.000, 0.019]
(500,200,250) 0.125 [0.109, 0.142]
(500,200,500) 0.336 [0.305, 0.370]
(500,200,1000) 0.245 [0.202, 0.296]
(500,250,100) 0.002 [0.000, 0.008]
(500,250,250) 0.038 [0.030, 0.046]
(500,250,500) 0.101 [0.088, 0.118]
(500,250,1000) 0.094 [0.066, 0.123]
(500,500,100) 0.003 [0.000, 0.011]
(500,500,250) 0.109 [0.097, 0.122]
(500,500,500) 0.426 [0.399, 0.454]
(500,500,1000) 0.472 [0.435, 0.512]
(1000,50,250) 0.008 [0.000, 0.033]
(1000,50,500) 0.009 [0.000, 0.040]
(1000,50,1000) 0.036 [0.000, 0.150]
(1000,100,250) 0.005 [0.000, 0.022]
(1000,100,500) 0.006 [0.000, 0.028]
(1000,100,1000) 0.041 [0.000, 0.126]
(1000,200,250) 0.032 [0.007, 0.060]
(1000,200,500) 0.083 [0.042, 0.135]
(1000,200,1000) 0.096 [0.021, 0.195]
(1000,250,250) 0.007 [0.000, 0.022]
(1000,250,500) 0.027 [0.006, 0.057]
(1000,250,1000) 0.058 [0.000, 0.134]
(1000,500,250) 0.033 [0.012, 0.060]
(1000,500,500) 0.141 [0.095, 0.188]
(1000,500,1000) 0.384 [0.297, 0.492]
(1000,1000,250) 0.085 [0.037, 0.143]
(1000,1000,500) 0.246 [0.180, 0.324]
(1000,1000,1000) 0.808 [0.627, 1.000]
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table F.5 MLE Estimation Results for RUM,
Three Coverages
RUM Model
β1 4.363 [3.953, 4.840]
β2 51.093 [47.265, 55.484]
Mean of ν 0.002 [0.002, 0.002]
SD of ν 0.0007 [0.0007, 0.0007]
Intercept −2.422 [-2.469, -2.379]
Age −0.081 [-0.103, -0.059]
Age2 −0.016 [-0.032, 0.002]
Female Driver 0.0007 [-0.018, 0.018]
Single Driver −0.015 [-0.034, 0.005]
Married Driver −0.018 [-0.047, 0.009]
Credit Score 0.037 [0.020, 0.055]
2+ Drivers −0.049 [-0.100, -0.0001]
Sigma 0.223 [0.201, 0.249]
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table F.6 Expected Monetary Loss by Group
Expected Monetary Loss
All −49.1 [-55.3, -44.7]
Female Driver −53.2 [-59.9, -48.0]
Single Driver −44.1 [-49.7, -40.2]
Young −44.4 [-49.1, -40.9]
Old −64.6 [-76.8, -56.1]
Low Credit Driver −46.3 [-51.4, -42.5]
High Credit Driver −53.6 [-62.0, -47.6]
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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